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Summary 
 
This thesis examines the effects of different types of cross border external linkages 
on group innovation.  
Diversified business groups are dominant business entities that control private 
sector activities in emerging markets throughout the world (Khanna and Palepu 2000). 
Despite the ubiquity and importance of business groups, the study of business groups 
is far from complete. For example, almost no work has been done on the 
technological innovativeness of business groups. While previous literatures generally 
focus on groups’ structures and address their corresponding economic performance, I 
look at groups’ behavior in establishing external linkages to innovate. 
Using Taiwan as the empirical setting, I examine how the effects of external 
linkages on group innovation vary depending on the type of linkages (joint Venture, 
licensing and acquisition) as well as the type of innovation (high-novelty versus low-
novelty). In theory, external linkages can help innovation through 1) reducing risks 
and 2) exploiting complementary assets. I further show that while licensing is more 
efficient in exploiting generic complementary assets, joint ventures and acquisition 
take advantage of exploiting more specialized complementary assets.  
The difference among types of external linkages in their exploitation of 
complementary assets has further theoretical implications. For example, whereas 
generic assets developed from routines procedures can be advantageous for firms to 
carry out incremental (low-novelty) innovation, the same assets may significantly 
reduce the research productivity of firms attempting to carry out an high-novelty 
(new product) innovation because such type of innovation requires the firm to process 
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quite different kinds of information. In this way, I propose that while licensing is 
more important in low-novelty innovation, joint ventures and acquisitions are more 
important in high-novelty innovation. 
I test my hypotheses and theories using various econometric techniques. To deal 
with the preponderance of ‘Zeros’ as well as the count number measure of dependent 
variable, I employ negative binomial model to run both pooled and panel regression. 
To check the robustness of my results, I also use input measure of innovation, i.e. 
R&D intensity. My results are robust to both patents and R&D based measures of 
innovation.  Finally, in order to tackle the possible endogeneity between external 
linkages and innovation, I also apply two recent econometric approaches for causal 
inferences. My evidence suggests that external linkages have a priori positive effect 
on innovation.  
This thesis has important implications for both managers at the firm/group level 
and policy-makers at the industry and nation level. At the firm/group level, by 
examining the role of different types of linkages on innovation, this thesis provides 
managers in emerging economies with practical insights regarding how to correctly 
choose the type of linkage in their efforts to innovate. At the industry or nation level, 
policy-makers need to be cautious towards the potential benefits and costs that 
external linkages will bring about to the total social welfare. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this thesis is to examine the effects of cross-border external linkages on 
business groups’ level of innovativeness. The growing interdependence of 
technologies and cross-fertilization of scientific disciplines has led to a growing 
appreciation for various types of external collaborative linkages among firms. 
However, most of the previous studies focus on localized regional linkages, networks, 
or clusters. Beginning from the self-evident Schumpeterian legacy, scholars have 
viewed regional network of linkages to be a privilege leading to innovation (Clark 
1990, Saxenian 1991). Piore and Sabel (1984) show that the externalities generated 
by regional networks of firms have been so important since the early days of the 
industrial revolution. Alfred Marshall (1890) already pointed to the vital role of 
externalities in ‘industrial districts’ where, as Foray (1991) reminded, ‘regional inter-
firm cooperation constitutes the basic principle of organization and functioning of 
innovative firms’.  
Recently organization studies indicated that the positions of firms in inter-
organizational networks may impact firm behavior and outcomes (Powell, Koput, and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996, Walker, Kogut, and Shan 1997). According to Gulati (1999), 
network relationship could become network resources with their facilitative role in 
various inter-organizational contexts.  Shan, Walker, and Kogut (1994), based on a 
study of biotechnology start-ups, found that firm’s network position as well as the 
number of collaborations it formed has positive relationship with its innovation 
output.  
Despite the growing consensus that regional linkages and networks matter for 
innovation, however, the effects of external (cross-border) linkages on technological 
 9
The Effects of External Linkages on Innovation 
innovation remain unclear. We do not really know if cross-border linkages benefit 
innovation or not. Nor do we know if the effects towards innovation vary across types 
of linkages as well as types of innovation. For example, in globalization studies, 
many studies still refer only to joint ventures and apparently assume that other forms 
of cooperation share identical features. In many empirical studies, joint ventures, 
technology exchange agreements, license agreements and a number of other modes of 
cooperation are placed under the same heading as ‘strategic partnerships’ or corporate 
ventures. In Hobday’s (1995) seminal study, although he shows that external or 
“cross-border” linkages have been instrumental for innovation in emerging 
economies, he doesn’t empirically differentiate between types of linkages on 
innovation. One of the most comprehensive empirical studies of innovation is project 
SAPPHO, which represents a whole generation of innovation research (Rothwell et al. 
1972-present) that measures about a hundred characteristics of 40 pairs of innovation. 
Again, this comprehensive empirical study of innovation, though confirmed the 
central importance of external collaboration with users and external sources of 
technical expertise, still did not make a clear distinction between different types of 
external sources.  
Obviously, external linkages differ in both organizational and economic effects. 
For example, a joint venture is a new company established by two or more partners 
and, as such, it introduces a change in an existing market structure; a licensing 
agreement, which regulates technology transfer in return for a fee, definitely has less 
far reaching consequences for the companies involved. In other words, it is important 
to note that different forms of organizational design of cooperation will have 
divergent effects on market structures and the companies involved. Various modes of 
interfirm cooperation can also be expected to be related to different strategies and 
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economic performances of participating companies, reflecting their ability to acquire 
external sources and carry out technological innovations (Hagedoorn 1990). 
Whereas external linkages may take a constellation of forms like joint ventures, 
licensing and acquisition, comparison studies between different types of linkages are 
still lacking; there is little empirical evidence regarding how different external 
linkages may have different effects on innovation. Similarly, the existing literature is 
largely silent regarding how the effects of linkages on innovation may vary depending 
on the type of innovations: high-novelty innovation versus low-novelty innovation 
(incremental)1.  
The lack of empirical research can be attributed to several challenges. First, it is 
extremely difficult to obtain subsidiary-level innovation data from a representative 
sample of multinational firms (Kogut and Chang, 1991). Second, while linkages may 
benefit innovation, innovative firms may be better positioned to form linkages, thus 
making the establishment of either direction of causality rather difficulty (Caves 1982, 
Kamien and Schwartz 1982). Third, the relation between linkages and innovation 
might be driven by a common unobserved factor such as appropriability. Failure to 
address any reverse causality or endogeneity will result in biased and spurious 
estimations.  
1.1 The Objectives of this thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to address the lacunae discussed above. 
In theory, external linkages can benefit innovation in two ways: (1) by reducing 
exposure to R&D related risks, and (2) by providing firms with access to 
                                                 
1 The difference here is depending on the so-called significance of innovation (Audretsch 
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complementary assets (Teece 1986, 1987) necessary for innovation. However, 
complementary assets are not the same. They can vary in terms of degree of 
specificity. To the extent that innovations require these assets that are specialized, an 
organization’s ability to use external linkages to innovate will depend on how useful 
the linkages are as channels for accessing those assets. The linkages that provide the 
most access to specialized complementary resources are likely to have the maximal 
positive effects towards innovation. By examining how the effects of linkages vary 
across different types of linkages (across-linkages effects) that are suitable for 
accessing different types of assets, I am able to provide a test for the complementary 
assets perspective. In addition, to the extent that innovations may vary on the type of 
assets they need, an examination of how the effects of a specific type of linkage vary 
over different types of innovation (within-linkages effects) provides a stronger test of 
the complementary assets theory. 
The importance of groups as the organizational conduit through which many of the 
external linkages are established as well as the economic and political significance of 
groups in most emerging economies makes them interesting as the unit of analysis. To 
the extent that groups are like multidivisional firms (M-form), I argue that firm level 
theories of external linkages and innovation can be applied to examine group level 
innovative performance. Using Taiwan as the empirical setting, I examine how the 
effects of cross border linkages on group level innovation vary over different types of 
linkages and different types of innovation. In particular, I distinguish among three 
types of linkages: licensing, joint ventures, and acquisition, and differentiate between 
two types of innovation: high novelty innovation vs. low novelty innovation. I find 
that, while acquisition is best suited for new product innovation (high novelty); it is 
                                                                                                                                             
1995). This categorization of this concept will be discussed later in the thesis 
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licensing that is most suitable for new style or new design (low novelty) innovation. 
This study fills several gaps in the literature. First, by focusing on the effects of 
cross-border linkages, I address a gap in the innovation literature that until now has 
mainly looked at the effects of geographically localized linkages. Second, while most 
of the literature on cross-border alliances and technology transfers still focuses on 
firms from developed economies, I look at the effects of linkages in the context of 
groups in emerging economies. Thus, I complement a small body of descriptive work 
that emphasizes the importance of external linkages through which firms from 
emerging economies can borrow technologies from abroad to move up the 
technological ladder (Amsden and Hikino, 1993, 1994; Hobday, 1995). By focusing 
on groups as the unit of analysis, I also shed light on the hitherto little studied 
interface between groups and innovation. Finally, I recognize that, while external 
linkages can affect innovation, innovation can also lead to new opportunities for 
external linkages, thus making the job of establishing causality especially difficult. I 
address this issue by applying two recent approaches for causal inference: the 
propensity score technique (Dehejia and Wahba; Villalonga, 2000) as well as the 
interaction variable method (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) to untangle the causality. 
 
1.2    Organization of this thesis 
The following chapters are organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews previous literatures on external linkages and group innovation. 
In this chapter, I discuss the motivations of external linkages, types of external 
linkages and business groups.  
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Chapter 3 constructs the theory and hypotheses. I show that external linkages can 
help group innovation by reducing risk and exploiting complementary assets. 
Chapter 4 discusses the empirical settings of this thesis. The source of data, 
construction of panel, measures of variables and model specification are further 
elaborated. 
Chapter 5 reports empirical findings using various statistical techniques. 
Chapter 6 employs two recent causality tests on the relationship between external 
linkage and innovation. 
Chapter 7 discusses findings and maps out further research agenda. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 External linkages and innovation 
The first question raised here is: why firms (groups) cooperate in their efforts to 
innovate? 
2.1.1 Motives for forming external linkages to innovate 
The first motive one finds in the literature is related to the increased complexity 
and intersectoral nature of new technologies and the interdependence of scientific 
disciplines (Mariti and Smiley 1983, Harrigan 1985, Ohmae 1985, OECD 1986a,b, 
Porter and Fuller 1986, Fusfeld 1986, Haklisch 1986, Klepper 1988). Technologies 
that formerly were peripheral to the commercial and research activities of a firm now 
have become central to competitive advantage in a number of technology-incentive 
industries. The growing interrelationship between, for instance, subfields of chemistry, 
physics, and electronics, computer science and process technologies, materials 
science, electronics, and chemistry has necessitated close collaboration between 
companies. One good example is the increased interdependence of 
telecommunications and computer technologies. Others include the growing 
importance of biotechnology within pharmaceuticals and food processing, or the 
greater salience of computer-based machine vision technologies within robotics 
equipment. Technological convergence means that firms must develop expertise 
quickly in a broader array of technologies and scientific disciplines, further straining 
R&D budgets and human resources.  
The above facts imply that even very large and diversified firms might still lack 
some competence in a broad spectrum of scientific and technological fields to 
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internalize all the resources necessary to produce and commercialize new 
technologies (Arora and Gambardella 1990, Teece 1996). No company will have an 
all-embracing competence in every field of technology. For companies to monitor the 
evolution of technologies and to assess technological synergies, near-future results of 
general scientific knowledge and relevant complementarities of technologies, a joint 
undertaking with another company might warrant a concrete evaluation of possible 
synergies at some stage of a particular technological trajectory. This factor has 
contributed to the expansion in interfirm research collaboration and in research 
collaboration between industry and universities throughout the world (Ghemawat, 
Porter and Rawlinson 1986). Cooperation creates the necessary complementary 
technology resources allowing these companies to capitalize through joint efforts 
with economies of scope (Hladik 1988).  
The second motive, mentioned in the literature, is the reduction, minimizing and 
sharing the uncertainty which is inherent to performing R&D (Berg, Duncan and 
Friedman 1982, Ohmae 1985, Harrigan 1985, 1988, Mariotti and Ricotta 1986, 
Hladik 1988).  The costs and risks of R&D can present a firm with two unattractive 
alternatives. It can pursue expensive R&D and face highly uncertain returns on its 
own in-house R&D investment. Otherwise, it can forgo aggressive R&D efforts and 
risk falling behind in the technical expertise necessary for the next generation of 
product development (Hladik 1988). It is probably this unknown likelihood of 
success in research that leads some companies to combine their efforts in order to 
create economies of scale and/or scope that will facilitate their search processes to 
expand to a wider field of research activities or expand their competence.  
Many studies thus refer to the reduction of risk in R&D as a major motive for 
shared activities; I, however, suggest it is more appropriate to think of this sharing of 
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R&D in terms of reduction of uncertainty. It is well known that risk can be defined as 
the probability distribution of the size of the event. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is 
associated with the unknown likelihood of an event when there is no probability 
distribution. These uncertainties in previous literatures can be summarized as below: 
1. Uncertainty of expected future R&D (Mariti and Smiley 1983, Hladik 1988). It 
is highly possible that the expected future R&D breakthrough does not occur, does 
not occur fast enough, or requires more financial or technical resources than 
originally expected  
2. Uncertainty of future consumer demand for the product (Contractor and 
Lorange 1988, Hladik 1988). This is a problem with any new-product introduction. In 
many high technology industries, for example, there may be a considerable lead time 
between the start of research efforts and the time the new product reaches the 
consumer. During this time, market factors can change; reducing or diverting 
consumer demand even before the product can reach the marketplace.  
3. Uncertainty of potential competitors (Hladik 1988, Porter and Fuller 1986). In 
order for an investment in R&D to pay off, a firm needs to achieve a certain market 
share. This share is dependent on the number and quality of rival products competing 
for the same market. There is the risk that a competitor could develop a product better 
and faster. 
4. Uncertainty of environment (Killing 1988). A participant’s assets would be 
directly affected by changes in the political, economic, competitive, and other aspects 
of the cooperative arrangement’s environment.  
Closely related to the previous argument is the motive of reduction and sharing of 
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costs of R&D (Ohmae 1985, Hladik 1988, Olleros and MacDonald 1988, 
Steinmueller 1988, Link and Bauer 1989). The key argument for this motive is the 
increase in costs of R&D in a large number of fields of technology. This motive is 
frequently mentioned in addition to the motive of the basic uncertainty of innovative 
processes. During the past 20-30 years, the costs of the research and development 
necessary to bring a new product or process to market in many high-technology 
industries have risen considerably—for example, commercial aircraft development 
costs have grown at an annual rate of nearly 20% for decades, despite advances in the 
application and productivity of the capital equipment used in the R&D process 
(Mowery and Rosenberg 1982). Similarly rapid growth in development and 
marketing costs has characterized the telecommunications equipment, computer, and 
microelectronics industries. Rising development costs place severe strains on the 
ability of firms to sustain ambitious R&D programs and increase the importance of 
penetration of foreign markets to ensure commercial success. Moreover, high 
development costs raise the risks of new product development, since they increase the 
fixed costs incurred before introduction of the product. Joint arrangement, thus, is one 
way in which a firm with limited financial resources can participate in new product 
development and stay at the forefront of technology.  
The third motive is more closely related to concrete innovative projects in a joint 
activity of two or more companies. In such a joint operation one (or both/all) partners 
can be motivated by the possibility of secretly capturing some of the capabilities, 
knowledge or technologies of partners (Mariti and Smiley 1983, Harrigan 1985, 
Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 1986, Lynn 1988, Pisano, Shan and Teece 1988, Hagedoorn 
and Schakenraad 1990a, b). Then, joint activities are merely a cover-up for an attempt 
to quickly absorb some innovative capabilities from others (Hagedoorn 1993). A firm 
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may look to a partner to provide access to new technology or proprietary know-how 
or else to provide technical skills complementary to its own. On the other hand, an 
agreed technology transfer of one partner to anther can also be a motive for interfirm 
cooperation. This technology transfer can equip one partner or both partners to leap-
frog their competitors. The Chinese foreign joint ventures are typical examples of 
R&D agreements where the foreign partner provides the bulk of the technical 
expertise. The McDonnell Douglas aircraft assembly venture, for example, includes a 
provision that Chinese scientists and technicians work with McDonnell Douglas on 
new aircraft design. For its part, the Chinese partner provides complementary 
resources to the venture—in this case, some access to the huge Chinese market. 
The other set of motives in this group is the reduction of the total period of the 
product-life-cycle and the contraction of the period between invention and market 
introduction as a motive for technology cooperation (Mariotti and Ricotta 1986, 
Mowery 1992, Berg and Hoekman 1988). Historical evidence suggests a speeding up 
of the product cycle. Especially in research intensive industries such as computers, 
each successive generation of technology tends to cost much more to develop; while 
at the same time product life cycles might shrink, leaving less time to amortize the 
development costs. Berg and Hoekman (1988) show that in technology-intensive 
industries, such as consumer electronics, rewards go to those enterprises that can 
create the new product, fill the new niche most rapidly, and handle the later phases 
with appropriate policies. A reduction in the duration of product cycles in many high-
technology industries has increased the urgency of rapid penetration of global 
markets with new products. Such rapid penetration may require joint production or 
collaboration with a firm with an established marketing network (Mowery 1992). 
The fourth group of motives is associated with a combination of market access and 
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technology development through a combined effort of companies. An argument in 
favor of cooperation is found in the opportunities for market entry through a joint 
monitoring of environmental changes in combination with developing new products 
or processes (Mariotti and Ricotta 1986, Olleros and MacDonald 1988). Firms with 
external linkages are far more responsive to environmental changes and opportunities 
than those firms would be on their own. This responsiveness takes the form of 
flexibility on the one hand, and single-mindedness on the other. Unfortunately, these 
two characteristics are rarely represented in one single firm. Placing the scenario 
between large incumbent firms and small entrepreneurial firms, Olleros and 
MacDonald (1998) postulate that linkages between these two types of firms can 
minimize their respective weakness while capitalizing on their strengths. 
At international level, combining some activities of two geographically separated 
firms for particular markets favors internationalization and globalization of 
companies that lack the economic control, competence or experience to follow such a 
strategy move independently (Ohmae 1985, OECD 1986a,b, Porter and Fuller 1986, 
Harrigan 1988, Lynn 1988, Mowery 1988, 1992, Pisano, Russo and Teece 1988, 
Womack 1988, Vonortas 1989). One remarkable advantage of international 
collaborative linkages is the access to large international markets. In general, building 
up a global organization and an international competitive presence is an expensive, 
time-consuming and difficult task. In this respect, firms with production capability, 
but lack of knowledge of foreign markets have to resort to the local partner. As 
pointed out by Contractor and Lorange (1988), medium or small sized companies 
who lack international experience, have to rely on external linkages such as joint 
ventures for their initial overseas expansion. Given the fixed costs of innovation, the 
larger the market, the higher the expected rate of return from the joint R&D activities. 
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A number of studies have show, in fact, that R&D investment is positively influenced 
by the expected domestic and international sales of the product (Schmookler 1966, 
Mansfield, Romeo and Wagner 1979) 
Moreover, immediate access to a large market can be especially important in 
industries where product lifetimes are short. Expected sales are dependent on both 
market size and the length of time over which the product is sold in these markets. As 
the time factor grows shorter, market access can become critical to the viability of 
R&D investment. 
Finally, one of the central motives for an innovative entity to establish linkages with 
partners is to exploit complementary assets (Teece 1986) 
The concept of complementarity is not new. Earlier in the organization theories, 
Richardson (1972) has already addressed this concept along with similarity from an 
organizational angle. He characterizes industrial activities in terms of similarity and 
complementarity: “Activities which require the same capability for their undertaking 
we shall call similar activities; we shall say that activities are complementary when 
they represent different phases of a process of production and require in some way or 
another to be coordinated” (Richardson 1972). Richardson’s objective is to account 
for the nature of industrial cooperation. The originality of his approach resides in the 
fact that the analytical point of departure does not correspond to market failure. He 
further indicated that complementarity has multidimensional character in that it may 
concern activities such as R&D, design, production, marketing, etc., just as much as it 
does the different phases of the elaboration of a product. Complementary activities 
should therefore be coordinated both qualitatively and quantitatively. Put in the 
context of the dynamic organizational balance, the recourse to internal coordination 
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arises whenever complementary activities are similar. The recourse to the two other 
coordination modes arises from the widening wedge between complementarity and 
similarity. In other words, the existence of complementary and non-similar activities 
entails the necessity for multiple coordination modes. The choice between market 
transactions and cooperation, which is to say, between an ex post coordination and an 
ex ante coordination, depends on the degree of complementarity of non-similar 
activities: an ex ante coordination (industrial cooperation) is necessary whenever 
activities are closely complementary, that is to say, when the qualitative and 
quantitative adjustment cannot be predicted within a framework of stable, authorized 
relations. In the contrary case, an ex post coordination (by the market) is sufficient: 
‘Impersonal coordination through market forces is relied upon where there is reason 
to expect aggregate demands to be more stable (and hence predictable) than their 
component elements” (Richardson 1972). In summary, cooperation exists whenever 
there is a need to coordinate non-similar but closely complementary activities: 
Following the reasoning of how to reach an optimal organization balance catering 
to innovation, Teece (1986) poses a more direct research question: who will win from 
technological innovation? Then the question becomes what is a commercially 
successful innovation? Teece (1986) suggested that in almost all cases, the successful 
commercialization of an innovation requires that the know-how in question be 
utilized in conjunction with other capabilities or assets. Services such as marketing, 
competitive manufacturing, and after-sales support are almost always needed. These 
services are obtained from complementary assets which are specialized.  
According to the nature of complementary assets, Teece (1986) differentiate three 
types of complementary assets: generic, specialized and cospecialized. 
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Generic assets are general purpose assets which do not need to be tailored to the 
innovation in question. Specialized assets are those where there is unilateral 
dependence between the innovation and the complementary asset. Cospecialized 
assets are those for which there is a bilateral dependence. For example, in textile 
industry, those general equipments and assets like elevators, warehouse, and 
workshops are kind of generic assets which can be employed in many other 
manufacturing activities other than textile. However, weaving machines, autoconers 
are specialized assets which could only be employed in producing textile products. 
There are also some more sophisticated digitalized autoconers (a digitally controlled 
and automatized textile machine) which need certain computer software to direct the 
operations. These assets are cospecialized because of the mutual dependence of the 
innovation on the automatization control.  
The focus in this thesis is to use complementary assets theory to explain how 
linkages will affect innovation and how different types of linkages would have 
different effects on innovation. Further discussion will be elaborated in the next 
chapter of this thesis. 
. 
2.1.2 Types of external linkages  
Strategic external linkages not only reflect differences in the motivation of partners 
or variation in its sectoral distribution, they also come in a number of inter-
organizational modes of governance. These distinct modes of organization for 
interfirm partnering can have a differentiated impact on technology sharing, various 
organizational contexts and possible economic consequences for partnering 
companies (Harrigan 1985, Auster 1987, Contractor and Lorange 1988, Buckley and 
 23
The Effects of External Linkages on Innovation 
Casson 1988, Root 1988, Hagedoorn 1990a, Osborn and Baughn 1990). Here it is 
necessary to mention the organization theory towards the categorization of external 
linkages which has been broadly reviewed in innovation and technology diffusion 
studies during the past three decades (Freeman 1991). 
Generally, from an organizational view, innovation can be developed either 
internally through resource integration or externally through linkages (Richardson 
1972). This idea actually links the innovation study to organization realm. Following 
this tradition, Gaffard (1990) postulated that the successful innovative firms are 
constantly struggling in maintaining a dynamic organizational balance between 
internal integration and external sources seeking. In this regard, organizational studies 
in innovation tend to elucidate the processes of integration and association of 
resources in a dynamic setting, not in the static efficiency terms of the economics of 
transaction costs. With the classical concepts of Marshall’s quasi-rent theory and 
irreversibility, organization scholars formulate the contradiction inherent to any 
organizational process of technology creation, between the need to integrate resources 
internally as a condition of innovation, and the need to leave these resources on the 
market, as a requirement of reversibility. To reconcile the terms of this contradiction 
is to allow the innovative firm to achieve organizational balance. 
Integration and irreversibility, a Marshallian quasi-rent approach. Work on R&D 
suggests that by entering into the firm, a resource acquires supplementary attributes 
as it becomes absorbed by the organization (Foray and Mowery 1990). This change in 
the nature of activities with the development of the organization can be interpreted 
with the aid of a concept that—“The value of collection of resources dependent on 
continued association for their maximum product exceeds their summed market 
values” (Alchian and Woodward 1988). As Alchian and Woodward (1988) reminded, 
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Marshall was the first to have formulated the theoretical principles allowing us to 
understand such a situation. with the aid of the concept of quasi-rent: ‘‘Composite 
quasi-rent is that portion of the quasi-rent of resources that depends on continued 
association with some other specific, currently associated resources” (Alchian and 
Woodward 1988).The association of R&D to other activities confers such a nature 
that the value of the associated activities exceeds the sum of their value on the market. 
By being integrated, R&D as an innovative capacity also becomes a learning capacity; 
when it is separated it loses this latter quality. The organization, as an association of 
activities whose principal property is to change as they are associated, becomes the 
preferred mode of extracting composite quasi-rent. The economic interpretation of the 
integration process rests on the recognition of this fundamental property in the 
internal coordination of resources. This raised the dilemma posed by Englander 
(1988): ‘‘(between) the weaknesses of technological determinism firms are 
managerial hierarchies because technological efficiency demands it  (and) the 
weaknesses of transaction cost determinism  firms are managerial hierarchies because 
organizational efficiency demands it” 
Meanwhile, the integration of resources also creates irreversibilities which may 
become obstacles to change (Gaffard 1990). As the resources become more specific, 
the range of choices available to the firm decreases. There are multiple dimensions to 
technological irreversibility (Dosi and Metcalfe 1989). On the one hand, some 
processes of self-reinforcement are determined by investments in constant capital and 
are situated at the level of the equipment. Thus, the capacity of a machine to maintain 
itself within a given productive structure depends less on the extent and nature of the 
original innovation than it does on the force of change of secondary innovations 
which improve the equipment (Foray 1985). Some irreversibility, on the other hand, 
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is primarily associated with human resources in that they constitute the principal 
domain of the learning process. 
The innovative firm’s organizational balance and uncertainty. The contradiction 
can now be formulated in the context of organizational dynamics of technological 
innovation. The contradiction is between the need to integrate resources as a 
condition of technology creation and the need to leave these resources on the market 
as a requirement of reversibility. ‘‘The integration process of activities and resources 
into the firm possesses a contradictory character: it is a factor of creation of new 
opportunities, on the one hand, and it generates irreversibilities which put obstacles in 
the way of change, on the other hand” (Gaffard 1990). The concept of the 
organizational balance of innovative firms is therefore based on the possibility of 
such firms reconciling the conditions for technology creation with the conditions of 
reversibility. Then, the problem facing an innovative firm is that its organizational 
forms with intra and/or inter-firm linkages appear as a primary form of realizing this 
organizational balance.  
In summary, I am now able to comprehend the organizational bases of the 
innovative firm: (1) each activity or resource acquires specificity (that is, becomes 
less and less transferable) subsequent to its integration into the firm, and this process 
continues as the organization develops in time; (2) this integration, involving the 
association of the activity in the process of technology creation, facilitates the 
extraction of quasi-rent; (3) at the same time, there is always the risk of provoking the 
emergence of irreversibility costs; (4) the concept of organizational balance of 
innovative firms is therefore based on the possibility of firms reconciling the 
mobilization of specific resources with the requirement of reversibility. It is thus 
possible to explain the emergence of different organizational modes with respect to 
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organizational dynamics. 
The search for organizational balance may be carried out in two fashions within the 
innovative firm. That is: full integration (intra-firm cooperation) and external linkages 
(inter-firm cooperation). These two forms of organizational architecture of 
cooperation are equally essential within the perspective of the creation of specific 
technological resources and innovation at the scale of the collective global 
organization. Generations of scholars have been endeavoring to find an optimal form 
of organization. Although, so far, there is still little consensus on which form of 
organization renders the most efficient one, one general conclusion has been widely 
accepted. Neither will most successful innovative firms choose a full integration form 
nor will they choose a full external linkages form, but a mixed form in-between. The 
real world rarely provides extreme or pure cases. Decisions to internal integrate or 
external linkages involve tradeoffs, compromises, and mixed approaches. It is not 
surprising therefore that the real world is characterized by mixed modes of 
organization, involving judicious blends of internal integration and external sourcing. 
In an empirical organization study based on Japanese innovative firms, Wakasugi 
(1988) showed that in either of the two extreme forms of organization, the creation of 
specific resources and innovation at the scale of the collective organization is 
extremely limited. In reality, only the mixture of two types of organizational form 
could take advantage of combining and integrating resources from different origins, 
thereby favoring the effective specificity of the collective organization. 
The question then is what can be the mixture or more accurately the compromise 
form between these two types of organizational forms? Typically, from intra-firm 
integration to inter-firm linkages, the two organizational forms represent a movement 
from internal coordination to external coordination, which tends to favor the other 
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two terms of the contradiction: a movement toward inter-firm external linkages 
reduces the specificity of resources but augments the reversibility of the firm’s 
commitment to a given technological trajectory. The following various forms of 
organization, for example, refer to this trend of movement from totally internal 
coordination to market contracts: Internal R&D, Joint R&D venture, technological 
licensing.   
To capture this idea, previous literature generally suggests three types of inter-
organizational collaborative linkages: licensing, joint venture and acquisition (Olleros 
and MacDonald 1988, Hagedoorn 1993). In this thesis, I also focus on these three 
types. Each type of linkage targets a particular set of complementary assets specific to 
innovation. 
These three types of linkages have important bearings for most emerging 
economies. Hobday (1995) shows that by evolving from OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacture) to ODM (Own-Design Manufacture) and later OBM (Own-Brand 
Manufacture), late industrialized countries move up the technological ladder and 
accomplish their industrialization take-off. The three types of linkages represent three 
phases of this evolution. In the early stage (1980s), OEM is often linked to licensing 
deals. Later, under ODM system, latecomer started to establish international joint 
ventures to capture more of the value-added while still avoid the risk of launching 
own-brand products. As latecomer firms grew in size and competence, and are able to 
launch their own-brand product (OBM), overseas investment and acquisition became 
another means of acquiring foreign technology.  
Table 1, for instance, outlines a summary of different type of linkages in major 
Taiwan business groups during the period of 1981-1998. The statistics show that joint 
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ventures, licensing and overseas acquisition in total make up roughly 87% of the total 
external linkages1. 
However, before considering each of the main forms of linkages in greater detail, it 
is essential to note the weaknesses in this category scheme. As Olleros and 
MacDonald (1988) criticized, such categorization omits the nuances that are 
particular to any specific business context, given industry structure, personalities 
involved, etc. Also, it translates a multi-dimensional reality into one dimension. For 
example, it remains quite difficult to answer which is the closer relationship: minority 
equity investment or a major R&D contract? Finally, while informal networks of 
linkages have been attached extreme importance in various research (von Hippel 
1988, Freeman 1991, Ahuja 2000), they are very hard to classify and measure under 
this categorization scheme. 
2.2 Business groups, external linkages and innovation 
Diversified business groups are dominant business entities that control private 
sector activities in most emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). In various 
country contexts, groups are referred to as jituanqiye in Taiwan, chaebols in South 
Korea, business houses in India, groups economicos in Latin America, grupos in 
Spain, family holdings in Turkey, and mining houses in South Africa. Such groups are 
ubiquitous in emerging economies, where they often control the country’s substantial 
fraction of productive assets and are often the largest and most influential firms of the 
country (Amsden and Hikino 1994, Granovetter 1998, Khanna and Palepu 1997). 
The ubiquitous business groups in emerging markets suggest that they may affect, 
in important ways, the broad patterns of innovation in each industry sector as a whole 
in emerging economies. Yet, our understanding of the group behavior is far from 
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complete. So far, the group level of analysis has been virtually invisible in the 
literature on industrial organization. For many countries, scholars’ research interests 
in economy are always at some level below or above that of the business groups. 
Below, they concern entrepreneurship, strategic management of individual firms, or 
labor relations. Above they concern how national economic policy is formulated. At 
the middle level of studying what formal and informal structures connect firms in the 
economy, however, there is remarkably little attention (Granovetter 1998).  
In response to this theoretical lacuna, recent literatures saw some analyses on 
groups and their economic performance in particular countries and regions (Leff 1978, 
Chang and Choi, 1988, Amsden and Hikino 1994, Chang and Hong 1998, Ghemawat 
and Khanna 1998, Fisman and Khanna 1998, Khanna and Palepu 1997, 1999).  
However, most of these studies view group as an organizational structure in response 
to some sort of market failure or institutional voids. For examples, Khanna and 
Palepu (1997) show that in countries where venture capital market is not viable, 
groups can serve as internal capital market to support financing. Powerful groups in 
emerging economy may often render influence on government to avoid policy 
distortion (Ghemawat and Khanna 1998). Unfortunately, few studies, hitherto, have 
shed light on group behavior and how group would virtually act as if a multi-
divisional firm to improve its economic performance. As a matter of fact, despite our 
understanding of firm’s external linkages and innovation, I know almost nothing on 
how groups’ external linkages will have any effect on innovation. Indeed, whereas 
group is an aggregation of member firms, the strategic behavior of a group can only 
be understood by break-down analysis of its component firms. The logic here 
suggests that in order to analyze group behavior such as establishing external linkages 
and carrying out innovation, I have to employ firm-level theories to validate my 
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argument. The problem here is to what extent a group with diversified member firms 
can be regarded in parallel to a firm with multiple divisions? To answer this question, 
I need to start from the definition of the business groups. 
2.2.1 Business groups, conglomerates and multidivisional firm (M-form)  
Business groups is a collection of firms bound together in some formal and/or 
informal ways, a concept as referring to an ‘intermediate’ level of binding—the level 
of binding components firms falls between short-term strategic alliances and a legally 
consolidated single entity. (Granovetter 1998). The definition, however, is necessarily 
somewhat arbitrary. Previous literatures suggest many synonyms to this concept, e.g. 
conglomerates, associations, federations. In a marginal case, groups can be 
conglomerate firms, in which a single firm has diversified into many industries by 
acquiring controlling shares. Strachan (1976) makes an important distinction by 
noting that in the typical conglomerate, a “common parent owns the subsidiaries but 
generally few operational or personal linkages exist among the sister subsidiaries. On 
the other hand, within business groups, there are generally personal and operational 
linkages among all the member firms”. Most western conglomerates fit the first 
description, in part because component companies are acquired and divested mainly 
on financial grounds, so that the set is likely to be reshuffled as financial outcomes 
dictate. Indeed, Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley (1992) chronicle the 1980s wave of 
“de-conglomeration” in the United States, arguing that American-style conglomerates 
are inherently unstable, as they eliminate the identity of the core firm as a sovereign 
actor, opening the way for shareholders and raiders to disassemble the parts. Other 
conglomerates, however, such as the Korean chaebol and Taiwanese guanxi qiye 
(business groups), are quite stable and fit the profile of a business group because they 
are the outcome of investments by a single family or small number of allied families 
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who, once having acquired the component companies, keep them together as a 
coherent group among which personnel and resources may be shifted as needed (Steer, 
Yoo, and Ungson 1989, Chang and Hong 1998). In summary, while groups in 
emerging economies are like conglomerates in many respects, the critical difference 
between business groups and western conglomerates lies in the ownership structure 
as well as the relationship among its member firms.  
Adopting an evolutionary new institutional economics approach, Chandler (1982) 
argues that the American industrial groups are evolving to be multidivisional form. 
The basic idea here is that whenever the organizational form of business groups has 
been used to permit a group of enterprises to be more efficiently administered from a 
central office, such business group has possessed the basic characteristics of a 
multidivisional form. He further concluded that these groups, though consisting of 
legally independent firms, are really approximations of the American multidivisional 
firm (M-form), with some “peculiarities due mainly to national characteristics 
inherited from history” (Chandler 1982). According to him, it was the shift of market 
control through contractual cooperation to through “administrative efficiency” that 
was responsible for the evolution of the multidivisional form of the industrial groups 
in America. Such “administrative efficiency” requires the formation of a central or 
corporate administrative office consisting of full-time senior managers assisted by a 
staff of specialists which has administrative authority over the operating enterprises in 
the group (Chandler 1982). 
In the context of Taiwan, business groups are conglomerations of leally independent 
firms under a single common administrative and financial control that are typically 
owned and/or controlled by families (Chang and Hong, 1998). According to this 
definition, business group in Taiwan is actually a combination of conglomerate and 
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multidivisional firm. For example, while the core company spread out manufacturing 
factories in subsidiaries, member trading companies are established to serve 
exclusively as an intermediary for international trade and member Investment 
Companies are often established for capital financing and fund transfer. Therefore, 
within a group, member firms do not stand on their own behalf, but rather operate 
collectively as if in a unified entity, a situation parallel to the multidivisional form but 
distinct from pure conglomerates. 
While business groups are similar to M-form firms, previous literature indicates that 
groups can differ from M-firms in four aspects: (1) ownership structure, (2) solidarity, 
(3) hierarchical structure, and (4) internal capital market. 
Ownership structure. By definition, all business groups consist of firms that have 
independent legal existence. But in some groups, every firm is owned directly or 
indirectly, in the sense of a controlling interest being held, by a single individual or 
family, or a set of related families (Chang and Hong 1998). This is typical of 
Taiwanese business groups, where most of the component firms are at least half 
owned by the founder or family member (Chung 2001). This centralized ownership 
may be associated with not only highly renowned groups such as Tatung, Acer but 
also with large number of smaller groups such as the 100 groups studied by Chung 
(2001). However, the common ownership is not typical of all business groups. At the 
other extreme, for example, Lazerson’s (1988) study of the networks of small to very 
small textile firms in Italy indicate that groups can evolve to be an elaborate system 
of cooperation and division of labor with no common ownership links at all. Under 
such situation, component firms may participate in the group on pure financial 
grounds. Coordination among member firms is not likely as comparable as multiple 
divisions within a firm. In case of Taiwan, the high ownership concentration of family 
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suggests that the relationship among component firms are more consolidated which 
typically characterizes what Chandler (1982) christened “administrative efficiency”. 
Consequently, Taiwanese business groups are similar to M-form firms. 
Solidarity. What distinguishes business groups from collections of firms united by, 
for example, common financial origins, as in American conglomerates, is the 
existence of social solidarity and social structure among component firms. It thus 
becomes of interest to what extent the underpinning or principles of such solidarity 
are clearly identifiable, by such factors as region, political party, ethnicity, kinship, or 
religion. Leff (1978) suggests that member of business groups are generally “linked 
by inter-personal trust, on the basis of a similar personal, ethnic or communal 
background”. Perhaps the most basic element is kinship, which is often a natural 
derivative of common ownership. Chandler (1977, 1990) has suggested that keeping 
family members in key managerial positions is a recipe for failure, since expanding 
firms, especially in technologically complex capital-intensive industries, desperately 
need professional management to coordinate economies of scale and scope. In this 
sense, a family-owned business group will be managerially handicapped compared to 
M-form firm. But this argument assumes the inability of families to produce 
technically sophisticated management, which is not true. Kim (1991) observes that 
while the share of professional managers in the chaebol has increased in recent years, 
the more important trend is the professionalization of family members. In Taiwan, 
this is especially the case. The sons and sons-in-law of the family owner are educated 
as professional managers; often they are sent to the United States to earn MBAs from 
prominent business school. Therefore, compared to M-form firm, Taiwanese business 
groups have less concerned with the managerial narrow vision which might be a 
handicap.   
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Group structure, hierarchical versus parallel. Business groups can be organized by 
a set of hierarchical authority relations or on equal footing. In the former case, 
business groups are strongly coordinated in the way like an M-form firm. One family 
owns all the firms and rules autocratically. In the latter case, business groups are 
composed of equal partner. Firms within a group are coordinated in a variety of ways, 
such as mutual stockholding and periodical councils—in which firm’s leaders meet 
periodically. Trading companies within such a group serve an explicit coordination 
role in primary products and financial companies sere as financial anchors within the 
internal capital market. Orru, Biggart and Hamilton (1991) suggest that while there 
are clearly more important and more influential firms within enterprise groups, the 
decision-making unit is the group, and the command is exercised not by fiat but by 
consensus. Decisions are made considering what is best for the collectivity, not 
simply for individual firms, however powerful. Unfortunately, such coordination is 
ready to go wrong when there are two firms with comparable power within a group. 
Actually, even familism of business groups in Taiwan often entwines with 
regionalism. Indeed, it is difficult to separate rivalries on these two dimensions if 
each clan is associated with a region. The competition might become so bitter that 
members of one group will not buy from the other even if it is the cheapest source 
(Biggart 1991). Compared to such groups, the Chandler (1982) pattern M-form firm 
with a central office that efficiently administrates the multiple divisions will not incur 
such embarrassment. These business groups, in a way, can not be regarded as a 
unified M-form firm. However, the case above indicates that the two governance 
structures need not characterize all the business groups in a country, as both 
hierarchical and parallel oriented groups may coexist. Unfortunately, previous 
literatures on this issue in relation to external linkage and innovation are almost 
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invisible. Nor are I able to identify these two kinds of groups with clear measure. 
However, if the group has two competing core firms, the positive effects of external 
linkages established by one component firm might not be readily shared by another. 
This implies that the innovation of such group cannot be relied too much on external 
linkage. Empirically, if I put the two kinds of groups together anyway for the test, my 
results will be underestimated. Then, once I do find positive effects in this 
circumstance, it actually provides a stronger test of my results. 
Internal capital market, banks and financial institutions within a group. In addition 
to patterns of ownership, of solidarity and of structure in business group, I need to 
know more about how such groups operate in their institutional settings. Economist’s 
interpretation of business groups often cast them as functional substitutes for capital 
market (Williamson 1975). In the natural history of business groups, those which 
begin with no affiliation to financial institutions usually form or acquire a bank early 
on, in order to assist in accumulating capital for group members from a wide variety 
of outside sources (Leff 1978). Empirical work by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 
(1991) demonstrates the existence of internal capital markets within Japanese keiretsu. 
The internal capital market argument for diversified business groups strikes us as one 
that has to be taken seriously in emerging economies such as Taiwan where capital 
market imperfections seem to loom larger in many of these countries (e.g., McKinnon 
1972). As Khanna and Palepu (1997) have pointed out, almost all the institutional 
mechanisms that make advanced capital markets work so well are either absent or 
ineffective in emerging markets. Therefore, business groups take advantage of their 
superior ability to raise capital to fund the ongoing activities as well as launching new 
ventures in emerging market (Khanna and Palepu 2000). Within the business groups, 
the internal capital market is often formalized through affiliated banks or financial 
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institutions (Khanna and Palepu 1997). The role of banks in the group has been 
documented not only as the sources of internal capital accumulation (Khanna and 
Palepu 1997, 2000) but also the ability to tap the resources and thereby expanded 
these capital resources to the region or even the whole economy (Lamoreaux 1986). 
Mintz and Schwartz (1985) found that such group affiliated banks are especially 
central in interlock networks of regional firms. Consequently, the influence of the 
bank within a group could have expanded far beyond the scope of that group but 
towards a region or even broader realm. 
In the case of a firm, when firms need capital to finance the innovation, such capital 
can be raised either internally or externally. In emerging economies, whereas external 
capital markets are not readily available with rampant market failure and information 
asymmetry, the flow of internal finance is the principal source of financing for firms 
that acquire technology through R&D (Himmelberg and Petersen 1994). In 
comparison, business groups are better positioned in access to capital than firm 
because the group-affiliated banks could not only raise fund internally by forming an 
internal capital market but also acquire external capital by the interlock networking 
with outside sources. However, even if this is the case, I can still regard a group as an 
M-form firm but with superior financial edge.  
As the above discussion shows, groups are a combination of conglomerates and M-
form firms. In terms of unrelated diversification, they are close to conglomerates, but 
in terms of internal linkages, they are close to M-form firms. Such an organization 
implies the benefits of external linkages can be shared among member firms within a 
group through direct and indirect coordination administrated by the core firm. To the 
extent Taiwanese business groups behave more like a M-form firm in terms of their 
internal linkages, firm level theories on external linkages and innovation can be 
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employed to explain how groups’ external linkage may affect their innovation. 
2.2.2 Group innovation through external linkages 
Compared to the abundant works on firm innovation and external linkages (Arora 
and Gambardella 1990, Mowery 1992, Amsden and Hikino 1994, Ahuja 2000), 
literatures on group innovation and external linkages are almost invisible. So far, 
almost nothing is known about the interface between groups and innovation. Nor do I 
know how group’s external linkages will affect its innovativeness. Nonetheless, there 
are a small number of studies talking about how business groups in emerging 
economies acquire technologies through external linkages. These studies remain 
largely anecdotal and do not give further theoretical and empirical insights of how 
external linkages may affect group innovation, in important ways. For example, by 
tracing the history of late industrialized firms in emerging economies, Hikino and 
Amsden (1994) indicated that, as individual late-industrializing firms in emerging 
economies do not possess a technological edge, they typically rely on external access 
to foreign markets by foreign investment to acquire technologies. These late-comer 
firms have gone overseas to acquire more advanced technologies than they are 
capable of developing at home. Hobday (1995) further shows that by evolving from 
OEM (original equipment manufacture) to ODM (own-design manufacture) and 
OBM (own-brand manufacture), Taiwanese family groups are gradually approaching 
the technological frontier. The important part here is: such evolvement of OEM to 
ODM and OBM is typically associated with a corresponding evolving pattern of 
external linkages from licensing to joint venture and overseas acquisition.  
An additional layer concerned with group innovation and external linkages is that, 
compared to firms, groups are better positioned to establish cross-border external 
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linkages with foreign partners. Put differently, whenever foreign companies are 
seeking partners in emerging economies, they often prefer domestic groups to 
individual firms. There could be at least two reasons: first, for foreign investors who 
are eager to put money into the fast-growing emerging markets but with few financial 
analysts and knowledgeable mutual-fund managers available to guide them, they 
have to turn to diversified groups and invest in a wide range of industries (Khanna 
and Palepu 1997). Investors trust groups to have a better evaluation of newly 
emerging opportunities and to exert an auditing and supervisory function. The groups 
thus become the conduit for large amounts of investment in their capital-starved 
countries. Second, in most cases, whenever foreign technology providers forge 
linkages in emerging economies, they often seek out domestic groups for groups’ 
ability to ensure property rights and other resources not readily available to them. 
Such advantageous “group resource” may rise to the level of the industry or even the 
nation. As Leff (1979) indicated, business groups are more powerful actors than 
single firms and can thus further translate their oligopoly power into political capital. 
Powerful groups in emerging economy may often render influence on government to 
avoid policy distortion (Ghemawat and Khanna 1998). Groups thus are trading their 
resource in return for advanced foreign technologies. 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed and discussed three important aspects of this study—
groups, external linkages and innovation. 
In the first dimension, external linkages and innovation, I first review the studies on 
the motivations of establishing external linkages to innovate. Previous literatures 
generally suggest the following groups of motives: motives related to basic research 
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and general characteristics of technological development, motives related to concrete 
innovation processes, motives for market access and opportunities and motives for 
exploiting complementary assets. I further differentiate between types of external 
linkages by reviewing the organizational theory. According to the organizational 
dynamics theory, it is in searching for the dynamic organizational balance that firms 
developed different types of linkage such as licensing, joint ventures and acquisition 
which typically characterize the move from market contractual to internal integration. 
In the second dimension, I review the literatures on business groups. I show that 
within the context of this thesis, business groups are a combination of conglomerates 
and multidivisional (M-form) firm. In terms of unrelated diversification, they are 
close to conglomerates, while in terms of internal linkages, they are close to M-form 
firms. The prevalent strong internal linkages among group’s member firms under 
common family ownership feature a close M-form organization. In line with this fact, 
I can employ firm-level theory to explain the behavior of group in forging external 
linkages as well as carrying out innovation. 
Finally, I point out the paucity of literatures on group innovation and external 
linkages. Among the small number of relevant studies, they are largely anecdotal and 
demand more theoretical and empirical insights. The following part of this thesis is 
going to address these issues both theoretically and empirically. 
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3 THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
3.1  Background 
3.1.1 Defining External Linkages and Innovation 
The wide variety of terms attached to external linkages among corporations often 
complicated the existing study. (Kogut 1988, Williamson 1991, Burgers et al. 1993, 
Culpan 1993, Hagedoorn 1993, Parkhe 1993). In this study, I define a cross-border 
external linkage, following Osborn et al. (1998), as a publicly recognized strategic 
alliance between two or more firms (sponsors) that are headquartered in separate 
countries. This standard definition (Contractor and Lorange 1988) allows us to 
differentiate it from internal coordination and regional/local linkages. While cross 
border linkages are important in developed as well as developing economies, the 
absence of a local regional cluster of technologically capable firms mean that external 
linkages would be more critical for firms in emerging economies trying to move up the 
technology ladder (Hikino and Amsden, 1994; Hobday, 1995). 
In line with previous literature, I identify three types of inter-organizational 
collaborative linkages: licensing, joint venture and acquisition (Olleros and 
MacDonald 1988, Hagedoorn 1993). Under licensing arrangement, firms pay for the 
right to manufacture products and the MNCs transfer the necessary technology for 
manufacture.2 Joint venture can be defined as a new legal entity with full status as a 
corporate entity in which both parent share equity (Auster 1987, Killing 1988, Osborn, 
Hunt and Jauch 1980). Under acquisition, a firm acquires the majority stake of another 
company, giving the firm the residual rights.  
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These three types of linkages have important bearings for most emerging 
economies. Hobday (1995) shows that by evolving from OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacture) to ODM (Own-Design Manufacture) and later OBM (Own-Brand 
Manufacture), late industrialized countries move up the technological ladder. The three 
types of linkages represent three phases of this evolution. In the early stage (1980s), 
OEM is often linked to licensing deals. Later, under ODM system, latecomer started to 
establish international joint ventures to capture more of the value-added while still 
avoid the risk of launching own-brand products. As latecomer firms grew in size and 
competence, and are able to launch their own-brand product (OBM), overseas 
investment and acquisition became another means of acquiring foreign technology.  
I also differentiate between two types of innovations: high novelty (new product 
innovations) and low-novelty (new style or design innovations). My categorization of 
high versus low novelty innovation actually follows the existing literature on 
incremental innovation. An innovation is of ‘low-novelty’ (incremental) if it is a 
logical extension of the firm’s existing knowledge base. On the other hand, the high-
novelty innovation shares some similarities with the more commonly referred ‘radical’ 
innovation but with some major difference.  
Following the standard definition, an innovation is “radical” if it requires the firm 
to process information quite different from their existing knowledge and capabilities. 
In this sense, a totally new invention (high-novelty) also involves considerable new 
technologies and knowledge which are likely to be different from the existing ones. In 
an extreme case, when such innovation is ‘novel’ enough, the commercialization of 
this invention might become competence destroying for other rivals, which in turn 
possesses the basic characteristics of a radical innovation.  However, in most cases, a 
totally new innovation (high-novelty) is not necessarily so ‘radical’ as to render the 
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existing knowledge obsolete. In this paper, I am not looking at the competence 
destroying aspect of an innovation but rather the new technologies and knowledge 
associated with the innovation per se. I consequently use the concept of ‘high-novelty’ 
innovation to differentiate it from low-novelty (incremental) innovation. 
3.1.2 Dual Benefits of External Linkages for Innovation 
There are primarily two types of benefits from external linkages.  
First, the reduction, minimizing and sharing the uncertainty which is inherent to 
performing R&D is often discussed as one of the main reasons behind external 
linkages (Berg, Duncan and Friedman 1982, Ohmae 1985, Harrigan 1985, 1988, 
Mariotti and Ricotta 1986, Hladik 1988). Uncertainty can arise in several forms. It is 
highly possible that the expected future R&D breakthrough does not occur, does not 
occur fast enough, or requires more financial or technical resources than originally 
expected. In many high technology industries, for example, there may be a 
considerable lead-time between the start of research efforts and the time the new 
product reaches the consumer. During this time, market factors can change; reducing 
or diverting consumer demand even before the product can reach the marketplace. 
Moreover, high development costs raise the risks of new product development, since 
they increase the fixed costs incurred before introduction of the product. 
The costs and risks of R&D can present a firm with two unattractive alternatives. It 
can pursue expensive R&D and face highly uncertain returns on its own in-house R&D 
investment. Otherwise, it can forgo aggressive R&D efforts and risk falling behind in 
the technical expertise necessary for the next generation of product development 
(Hladik 1988). It is probably this risk that leads some companies to combine their 
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efforts in order to create economies of scale and/or scope that will facilitate their 
search processes to expand to a wider field of research activities or expand their 
competence.  
Second, new technologies require multiple sets of complementary technical 
developments, which necessarily go beyond the scope of even the largest firms (Baba 
and Imai 1990, Freeman, 1991). In almost all cases, the successful commercialization 
of an innovation requires that the know-how in question be utilized in conjunction with 
other capabilities or assets (Teece, 1986). Services such as marketing, competitive 
manufacturing, and after-sales support are almost always needed. Innovator could 
attempt to access these assets through various external linkages (such as joint ventures, 
licensing, R&D collaboration and acquisition). Recent studies show that firms’ 
collaborative linkages can provide complementary resources and allow firms to 
combine knowledge skills and physical assets (Ahuja 2000). 
During periods in which the pace of technological change is high and many new 
techno-market opportunities are generated, the failure of firms to detect and gain 
access to newly emerging capabilities can rapidly result in both product and process 
obsolescence. Appropriately constructed strategies, based on a combination of in-
house technological accumulation and external inputs enable firms to update existing 
products or move to new product areas (Dodgson and Rothwell 1987, Mayer-Krahmer 
and Kuntze 1987). Therefore, not only in-house R&D commitment that should be a 
prime focus of corporate technology strategies, also of extreme importance is having 
an external orientation directed towards creating external linkages plugging the firm 
into appropriate sources of complementary technological information and expertise 
(Dodgson 1989, Rothwell, 1989). 
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3.2 Hypotheses Development 
In this section, I employ the complementary assets perspective to derive 
implications for effects of cross border linkages on innovation. As Teece (1986) 
pointed out, there are three broad categories of complementary assets: generic, 
specialized and co-specialized.  While generic assets are generally purposed assets 
which do not need to be tailored to the innovation in question, specialized and co-
specialized assets form unilateral and bilateral dependence between collaborative 
innovators. In the discussion below, I argue that external linkages are not homogenous; 
specifically, they differ in the types of complementary resources they supply. Similarly, 
I argue that innovations also differ in the type of complementary resources they 
demand. Based on these two theoretical building blocks, I derive empirical 
implications regarding how the effects of external linkages on innovation would vary 
across types of linkages and types of innovations. 
3.2.1 Linking Specific Types of Linkages with Specific Types of 
Complementary Resources 
3.2.1.1 Technological licensing 
Under licensing arrangement, firms pay for the right to manufacture products and 
the transnational corporations transfer the necessary technology for manufacture.3
Licensing only exploits generic complementary assets that are not generally 
suffered from appropriation problems (Teece 1986). These generic assets are often 
acquired in forms of a licensing ‘package’ which contain not only the engineering and 
production knowledge but also concerned with marketing and distribution. The 
advantages of such a contractual solution are obvious. The innovator will not have to 
 45
The Effects of External Linkages on Innovation 
make the upfront capital expenditures needed to build or buy the assets in question. 
This reduces risks as well as cash requirements. As Harrigan (1988) noted, contractual 
arrangements like licensing can expedite the operational speed with which many 
actions in pursuit of global strategies can be taken. When dealing with generic assets, 
collaborators under licensing can renegotiate the provisions of contractual agreement 
at any time, and incur less cost and difficulties than any other arrangements when such 
relationship terminates or fundamentally changes (Harrigan 1988). This is of course 
why franchising is so popular with small firms and start-up enterprises, as it provides 
almost all (except for an initial capital outlay) the entry components without a 
substantial commitment of operating duties and large sink cost. The engagement of 
these small firms in licensing agreements allows them to gain access to products which 
complemented their own product range. This was effectively a way of making up for 
an in-house product development deficiency.  
 
3.2.1.2 Joint Ventures  
Joint venture can be defined as a new legal entity with full status as a corporate 
entity in which both parent share equity (Auster 1987, Killing 1988, Osborn, Hunt and 
Jauch 1980). International Joint ventures was an important step for emerging 
economies, sparking off the second phase of late industrialization—ODM. 
Joint venture can exploit both generic and specialized complementary assets. 
Previous literatures generally address these assets in marketing and complementary 
technological knowledge. Companies who lack international experience are mostly 
likely to establish a joint venture for their initial overseas expansion. This may be 
especially true when the firm is from a developing or emerging economy (Lall, 1981). 
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In a cross-sectional study, Dunning and Cantwell (1983) show that the lower the GDP 
per capita of the host nation, the more likely a MNC is to use joint ventures in its 
initial international expansion. The history of Taiwanese business groups expanding 
into the US market shows that in the early stages, they would link up with established 
US companies. This gave them a ‘beachhead’ and a longer learning period before 
developing channels of their own. 
In another aspect, faster entry into a market may also be possible if the testing and 
certification done by one partner are accepted by the authorities in the other partner’s 
territories. Or, one partner may cede the rights to a partially developed process to 
another firm which refines it further, with the fruits of the development to be shared in 
a joint venture. In this regard, the marketing or territorial right is the dominant strategic 
issue. By pooling or swapping technologies and knowledge, companies also pool or 
swap markets.  
Joint ventures may be formed to pool the specialized complementary technologies 
of the partners. Such formulation may often take a form like vertical integration 
through which both parties may more easily permit long-run strategic decision. From a 
transaction cost view, the exchange of many specialized assets could be better 
conducted without redundant inter-firm contracting, transaction and negotiation costs 
(Williamson 1975). This leads to cost reduction or economies of scale from combining 
common administrative, reduction of transport or information processing activities in 
two more stages of production or distribution. Moreover, it also allows for 
internalizing specialized abilities and secrets within a single venture (Buckley and 
Casson 1976). Such internalization offers both parties better opportunities to 
understand the strategies within the whole industry, allowing the integrated firm to 
outcompete its more fragmented rivals.  
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Another layer of the benefits from such collaboration lies in knowledge creation. 
The joining together of firms with corresponding clash of ideas and complementary 
knowledge bases stimulates the creativity of R&D teams. In general, it is important to 
consider joint venture as vehicles to bring complementary knowledge and talents 
together which provide different foundations of know-how needed in high technology 
industries. Such creations of ‘electric atmospheres’ can bring out significant 
innovations not likely to be achieved in any one parent organization’s ‘mono-culture’ 
context (Contractor and Lorange 1988). 
 
3.2.1.3 Acquisition 
Companies scan the environment for viable concepts, especially growing chains 
that have already penetrated regional markets, and then buy the concept by purchasing 
the existing chain. In doing so, they immediately gain a market-proven concept and 
established points of distribution. Instead of relying on internally driven research and 
development, these companies are externally focused. They wait for the marketplace to 
select winning concepts and then they buy future growth. As business groups in 
emerging economies grew in size and competence, acquisition and overseas 
investments became another means for their component firms to acquire foreign 
technology. Business groups such as Samsung and Hyundai purchased several high 
technology firms to acquire skilled engineers and equipment.  
Direct acquisition provides the strongest basis for exploiting specialized or co-
specialized assets with little danger of leakage or dilution of control (Mowery 1992). 
As is well documented, failure as a result of collaboration like joint venture may 
largely come from diverging strategies and power, the realization of incompatibility of 
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assets, or even the persistence of opportunistic behavior (DeBresson and Amesse 1991). 
Acquisition doesn’t incur these coordination problems that joint collaborative ventures 
typically suffer, but rather take advantage of exploiting more specialized 
complementary assets than joint ventures do. 
Acquisition is more efficient than joint ventures and licensing in exploiting new 
technological capabilities which are indispensable assets required for innovation. 
Generally, the demand of these new technological capabilities will emerge when a 
group attempts to make a deployment of existing firm-specific capabilities in a foreign 
country (Teece 1982, Caves 1996, Zaheer 1995). However, the rigidity of 
organizational routines and inertias often constrains a firm to internally develop new 
capabilities that vary substantially from existing activities (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Within a group, component firms’ ability to change such organizational routines is very 
limited. Where there is difficulty in internal development, the component firm can 
meet demand for new capabilities by seeking collaborative partners or purchase 
required capabilities bundled from outside firms (Wernerfelt 1984) However, the costs 
of seeking a partner and potential break-up increases as resources become more 
specialized and complex (Teece 1986). Hence, if the component firm faces capability 
demands on innovation and capabilities are subject to high specialization, acquisitions 
permit the firm to obtain required capabilities more efficiently than other joint 
collaborative ventures (Teece 1987, Mitchell 1994).  
Market entry is another important component of the complementary assets that 
most external linkages attempt to explore. For business groups in emerging economies, 
acquisition is the best choice for market entry compared to joint venture. When devoid 
of local marketing capabilities, multinational business groups have several choices for 
market entry. For one, group employs its component firm to enter using marketing 
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arrangements and joint ventures with local firms (Chen and Hennart 1995). However, 
these arrangements and collaborations breed risk in future competition with local firms, 
and an entering firm would generally prefer to have tighter control over marketing 
operations. A second option, building marketing capabilities from scratch, poses other 
challenges: in such a new risky environment, the returns may not be secured and 
visible in a short period before rivals establish dominant positions. As Anand and 
Delios (2002) show, such a ‘greenfield’ entry mode is only applicable when a firm has 
relative technological advantage which doesn’t necessitate to pay a premium for 
acquisition. With limited relative advantage in technology, groups from emerging 
economies are unlikely to adopt such mode of entry. Given the inseparability of 
capabilities from owners, the acquisition of capabilities by the purchase of local firms 
remains a dominant choice (Chen and Zeng 1996). Hence: 
The preceding discussion points out the linkages differ in the type of resources that 
can be acquired through those linkages. While acquisition is best for attracting 
specialized complementary resources, licensing is best for attracting generic 
complementary resources. Propositions 1, 2 summarize this conclusion: 
Proposition 1: Licensing is better than Acquisition for accessing generic 
complementary resources 
Proposition 2: Acquisition is better than Licensing and Joint Venture for accessing 
specialized complementary resources 
 
3.2.2 Linking Specific Types of Innovation with Specific Types of 
Complementary Assets 
As is noted above, successful innovation requires complementary assets. For 
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different types of innovation, the corresponding complementary assets required for that 
type of innovation may be different.  
Types of innovation and types of external linkages 
When the environment is relatively stable, firms are constantly facing routine tasks 
involving the repetitive usage and development of generic assets like fixed marketing 
channel and existing general technology (Cyert and March 1963). As noted by Arrow 
(1974), in such a stable environment, firms will rationally invest in “communication 
channels’ and “information filters” that reduce the cost of processing routine 
information. When firms are engaged in incremental (low-novelty) innovation, generic 
assets developed from ‘routine’ or ‘procedure’ in response to competitive tasks are 
sources of considerable advantage (Nelson and Winter 1982). Similarly, contingency 
theorists such as Burns and Stalker (1966), Galbraith (1973) and Daft (1982) have 
suggested that firms develop these ‘mechanistic’ generic assets so that they could cope 
quickly and effectively with their environment. These assets are of considerable 
advantage to firms engaging in an incremental innovation, as firms can generally 
utilize these generic assets to build around an extant product (Henderson 1993).  
However, the same generic assets discussed above may significantly reduce the 
research productivity of firms attempting to carry out an innovation that is of high-
novelty, in the sense that it requires the firm to process quite different kinds of 
information. In this context, the generic assets such as routine information filters and 
organization procedures that developed through the firms’ previous experience are 
subject to partially obsolete. This implies that such a high-novelty innovation requires 
new specialized technological capabilities and organizational procedures which have to 
be either developed internally from scratch or exploited externally. As long as firm’s 
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capability to internally develop theses assets is often constrained by the rigidity and 
inertia of organizational routines (Nelson and Winter 1982), external linkages become 
overridingly important for firms to acquiring these new specialized technological 
capabilities. 
As is noted above, successful innovation requires complementary assets. The 
underlying layer of this argument implies that for different types of innovation, the 
corresponding complementary assets required for that type of innovation would be 
different. If external linkages do help innovation through exploiting different 
complementary assets, the effects of linkages are likely to vary across different types 
of innovations. Propositions 3 and 4 are used to summarize this discussion: 
Proposition 4: Generic assets are relatively more important for low-novelty 
innovation 
Proposition 5: Specialized assets are relatively more important for high-novelty 
innovation 
 
3.2.3 Effects of Linkages on Innovation: The Across-linkages Effects 
Recall the discussion in the previous section, while licensing takes advantage of 
exploiting generic assets, its ability to exploit specialized and cospecialized assets is 
rather limited. Specifically, as linkages under licensing are short-term in nature and 
involve less interaction, one or both parties in this contract will have to commit capital 
to certain irreversible investments that will be valueless if such short-term licensing 
relationship breaks down (Teece 1986).  
Comparing to licensing, Joint ventures are not confined to only exploiting generic 
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assets but specialized assets as well. However, when dealing with generic assets, the 
time and costs involved in developing multiparty equity arrangement coupled with the 
need for given-and-take in jointly managed ventures gives the joint venture form of 
governance less strategic flexibility than the less binding forms of cooperation like 
contractual licensing (Harrigan 1988). Put simply, if assets are generic in nature, firms 
rationally do not need to commit heavy initial sank cost as well as administrative costs 
to acquire these assets at a risk of potential project failure. 
When dealing with specialized assets, joint ventures, in contrast display more 
viability. During the past 20-30 years, the costs of the research and development 
necessary to bring a new product of process market in many high-technology 
industries have risen considerably—for example, commercial aircraft development 
costs have grown at an annual rate of nearly 20% for decades, despite advances in the 
application and productivity of the capital equipment used in the R&D process 
(Mowery and Rosenberg 1982). The rising development cost features a growing 
specialization of new technologies as well as management expertise. These new 
specialized assets often involve high ‘inseparability’ which refers to the fact that much 
of the firm’s non-codified technological know-how may be embedded in the 
organization. The transfer therefore will require the transfer of a large number of 
individuals. As Teece (1982) noted, separating and transferring a substantial portion of 
the parent firm’s staff to another enterprise may not be readily feasible. However, the 
noncodifed, ‘inseparable’ character of firm-specific assets that may preclude their 
exploitation through contractual arrangement like licensing need not prevent the 
pooling of such assets by several firms within a joint venture, or the effective sale of 
such  assets by one firm to another within a join venture (Mowery 1992). Joint venture 
can unbundle the specialized assets of a senior firm such as technological portfolio for 
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arm’s length’s transfer which cannot be captured through licensing (Mowery 1992). 
Like joint venture, acquisition exploits both generic and specialized assets. 
However, when dealing with generic assets, acquisition shares similar disadvantages as 
joint ventures. Similar to joint venture, the settlement of an acquisition requires heavy 
initial investment cost and administrative cost. Moreover, compared to joint venture, 
there are additional risks coupled with acquisition. As Hitt et al. (1991) show, the fact 
that acquisition offer immediate entrance to a new market and/or a large share of a 
market caused a shift of decisions to emphasize acquisition and deemphasize research, 
which results in increased managerial commitment and disincentives for internal 
research. Such strategic shift may fall into a vicious circle: since external acquisition is 
relative easy, less and less attention is paid to internal research and development. In the 
mean time, the growing need for new technologies to gain competitiveness forces to 
company to acquire even more. Heavy debt costs often come by in this scenario. And 
such debt costs often force managers to substitute payments of the costs not from 
inefficient uses but rather from investments that can be postponed without immediate 
negative outcomes (e.g. R&D) (Hoskisson and Hitt 1988). 
When dealing with specialized assets, acquisition shows its positive flip side. If 
specialized assets often involve the characters of ‘noncodification’ and ‘inseparability’, 
the most direct way is to totally acquire it by buying in all existing value chains. 
Compared to joint ventures, acquisitions doesn’t typically incur certain coordination 
cost ingrained in collaborative ventures while still take advantages of exploiting highly 
specialized assets. As Mowery (1992) reminded, once the process and technologies 
within a joint venture are sufficiently advanced or completed, partners may no longer 
wish to remain in a joint venture. These motives themselves often change in response 
to changes in the environment or within the participating firms. A joint venture only 
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represents a partial internalization, while acquisitions basically involve complete 
pooling of the partner’s profit streams or the establishment of a single hierarchy. As 
Harrigan (1988) noted, shared ownership and shared decision-making arrangements 
can be cumbersome to manage and may reduce the speed with which many actions in 
pursuit of global strategies can be taken. Consequently, acquisition, with a single and 
integrated hierarchical decision structure, has higher efficiency for firms in pursuit of 
innovative strategies. 
For acquisition, as summarized by Wilson (1980), companies without significant 
foreign experience may find it necessary to buy existing firms for the purpose of 
acquiring the specialized new technological capabilities of dealing with the local 
environment. As a result, acquisition takes advantage of supporting innovation by 
efficiently exploiting specialized assets and new technological capabilities that are 
required by innovation. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1(a) [Across-linkages]: In high-novelty innovation, the positive effects 
of Acquisition on group’s innovative performance will be stronger than that of joint 
venture and licensing.  
Hypothesis 1(b) [Across-linkages]: In low-novelty innovation, the positive effects 
of Licensing on group’s innovative performance will be stronger than that of joint 
venture and acquisition. 
3.2.4 Effects of Linkages on Innovation: The Within Linkages Effects 
From the discussion of the previous section, it follows that the positive effect of 
licensing on innovation will be much less distinctive when the innovation is dependent 
on specialized complementary resources. Nevertheless, generic assets might be 
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especially helpful in carrying out incremental innovation. As von Hippel (1988) 
suggested, a would-be innovator can often invent around a licensed technology based 
on that licensing package. In most instances, inventing around is relatively easy 
because there are many known means by which one might achieve an effect equivalent 
to the existing technology. To the extent that licensing take most advantages in 
exploiting generic assets, its positive effect on innovation will be only remarkable for 
incremental (low-novelty) innovation. Licensing will be least beneficial for high 
novelty innovations which require specialized complementary resources. However, the 
opposite is true for acquisition. The benefits of acquisition will be maximal for 
innovations that require specialized resources. Thus, acquisition will be optimal for 
high novelty innovations that depend on specialized investments. For low novelty 
innovations, the benefits of acquisition are less clear. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2(a) [Within-linkages effects]: The positive effects of Licensing on 
group’s innovative performance will be stronger in low-novelty innovation than in 
high-novelty innovation. 
Hypothesis 2(b) [Within-linkages effects]: The positive effects of acquisition on 
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3.2.5 Product Diversification and Geographic Diversification 
Many business groups with various external linkages often operate in diversified 
countries and product portfolios. The complexity of managing product and 
geographically diverse groups, particularly those operating in growing global 
competition has hastened the search for ways to gain and sustain competitive 
advantage through innovation. As a result, it is important to examine groups’ strategies 
in product and geographic expansion. 
Moderating effects of product diversification 
Product diversification is expansion into product markets new to a firm. 
Economists have generally predicted a negative relationship between product 
diversification and innovation (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989). Accordingly, 
empirical research supports a negative relationship between product diversification and 
innovation. For example, Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) and Baysinger and Hoskisson 
 57
The Effects of External Linkages on Innovation 
(1989) found that U.S. firms with greater product diversification invested less in R&D. 
Doi (1985) found the same relationship among extensively diversified Japanese firms.  
In theory, I have shown that external linkages help innovation through reducing 
risks and exploiting complementary assets. However, product diversification adds risks 
in this scenario. Essentially, governance scope tends to exceed managerial capabilities 
when a manager is actively involved in increasing number of businesses, giving rise to 
information-processing and control problems (Hill & Hoskisson 1987).  Managers 
failing to deal with the increasing amount of information and business transactions for 
innovation are forced to either focus on only several businesses or shift their strategic 
controls to financial controls (Hoskisson and Hitt 1988, Baysinger and Hoskisson 
1989). In case of the former, the risk of project failure of those less focused business 
will increase. In case of the latter, firms focusing on short-term financial controls will 
succumb to lose their competitiveness in the long run (Bettis and Hitt 1995). This 
creates another layer of risk in losing sustainable comparative advantage.  
Product diversification might go beyond groups’ capabilities to utilize existing 
complementary assets for innovation. This is especially the case for specialized and co-
specialized assets which often involve bilateral distribution channels and specialized 
manufacturing capacity. As innovation in each product lines often require several 
specialized distributions and information channels, the number of these interactions 
required to coordinate between collaborative partners will increase at a geometrical 
rate with the growing number of product lines. Eventually, the actually accrued 
complementary assets exploited through external linkages are not able to keep pace 
with the growing number of product lines. The logic suggests a diminishing positive 
effect of external linkages on innovation. Hence: 
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Hypothesis 3: Product diversification negatively moderates the relationship 
between the number of external linkages and the level of innovation. 
 
Moderating effects of geographic diversification 
Geographic diversification stands for the diversity of sources of external linkage 
Thus, a group's level of geographic diversification is reflected by the number of 
different regions/countries in which it operates and their importance to the firm. 
Geographic diversification within this thesis is quite similar to the concept of 
international diversification which is widely used by international business scholars. 
Past researchers have proposed a positive relationship between international 
diversification and innovative performance, but the results of empirical tests have been 
decidedly mixed (Geringer et al. 1989, Rugman 1979). In this thesis, I thus postulate 
two competing hypotheses and leave this puzzle as empirical questions. 
As positioned earlier in this thesis, groups establish external linkages to explore 
more complementary assets such as markets. Usually, many groups with multiple 
external linkages also operate in diversified products. These various products may not 
all be absorbed in one country. By probing into more geographical markets, firms open 
up more market options to commercialize their product, which potentially increases the 
possibility that firms can make profits from product innovation (Teece 1986). 
Furthermore, firms may be better able to retain their innovative capabilities by tapping 
the various resources available globally (Kotabe, 1990). Thus, geographically 
diversified firms have access to more and different resources. With the larger markets 
and potentially greater returns, they have more resources to invest in innovation.  
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Diverse knowledge is another complementary assets often required to develop 
innovation. Geographic diversification provides better opportunity for new and diverse 
ideas from a variety of market and cultural perspectives. This suggests that 
geographically diversified firms have greater opportunities to learn (increasing 
organizational knowledge) than do mono-market groups who might suffer a “narrow 
vision” problem in coming up with new ideas.  
Geographic diversification can also help firms to efficiently use complementary 
assets under the selective advantages of multiple countries. Geographically diversified 
business groups have wider options to decide how to better distribute their R&D 
resources in the most appropriate locations. As such, complementary assets can be 
tapped into the most efficient places. Hence: 
Hypothesis 4a: Geographic diversification positively moderates the relationship 
between external linkages and the level of innovation.  
Although geographic diversification can exploit more complementary assets, the 
exploitation may not occur successfully because geographic diversification creates 
conditions that prevent firms from taking advantages of these assets. 
While external linkages bring about market expansion, the growing size and 
number of new markets is also associated with the mounting need for market 
adaptation (Hakanson 1992). The layer of market uncertainties can be expected to be 
the most acute in markets that significantly differ from the home market where most 
products were originally developed. This is especially the case for firms in emerging 
economies whose international experience is sparse. Moreover, cultural dissimilarities 
as well as different income levels further exacerbate this situation. The same argument 
in line with market uncertainty is the political uncertainty. Trade barriers and other 
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forms of protectionism often complicate the potential risk for groups that operating in 
diverse countries with various political climate. 
Whereas diverse knowledge is a source of innovation, high diversity of these 
knowledge is often accompanied with the problem of ‘Psychic distance’—defined as 
“the sum of factors preventing the flow of information from and to the market” 
(Johanson and Wiedersheim 1975). Empirical studies show that the psychic distance 
has significant negative effect on the communication between linkage partners 
(Hakanson 1992). Therefore, high geographic diversity reduces the efficiency for 
groups to utilize complementary assets.  
The above discussion generally suggests increasing costs that associated with the 
growing level of geographic diversification. When a business group operates in 
multiple international markets, the costs of market adaptation and inefficiencies in 
communication will reduce group’s ability to take advantage of complementary assets. 
Eventually, the marginal benefits that earned from opening up a new international 
market are less than the marginal costs that needed to overcome the adaptation and 
communication problems. Hence:  
Hypothesis 4b: Geographic diversification negatively moderates the relationship 
between external linkages and the level of innovation.  
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4 DATA, MEASURES, AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
4.1 The Empirical set-up 
I use data on Taiwanese business groups to test my theoretical predictions.  
According to Teece’s (1986) complementary assets theory, specialized and co-
specialized assets become critically important under weak appropriability regime, as 
the irreversibility and inimitability involved prevent competitors from appropriation. 
When appropriability regime is tight, generic assets, however, are often viable as 
competition from imitator is often muted in this regime. Inasmuch as contractual 
relations like licensing suffice to exploit these generic assets, it may partly explain 
why previous empirical studies in developed economies with relatively tighter 
appropriability regime often find significant positive effect of licensing on innovation 
(Lowe and Crawford 1984). Institutional settings, in this respect, are especially 
important in justifying these empirical evidences. Using emerging economy as an 
empirical setting, I try to show that under weaker appropriability, the effects of 
linkages on innovation will vary across different types of linkages. By doing so, it 
also implements a stronger test of my hypotheses on complementary assets.  The 
prevalence of external linkages in Taiwan’s corporate landscape as well as the weak 
appropriability regime makes Taiwan especially attractive for this study.  
I rely on patents as my primary measure of innovation. However, patents are not 
the only way by which a firm appropriates returns to its innovations. In fact, Cohen, 
Nelson, and Walsh (2000) identified some other mechanisms such as secrecy, 
complementary sales, and service capabilities and quicker lead times to be more 
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important than patents. Moreover, when a firm patents, it is sometimes not for 
appropriating direct profits from an innovation but instead aimed at either the 
development of a new substitute product or as a threat to force competitors to 
negotiations. “However, when used in large samples, patent count is still a useful 
measure of innovation.” (Khanna and Singh, 2002).  
Instead of using US patents, I use patents granted in Taiwan as my primary 
measure of innovation. Taiwan is the fourth largest patentee in terms of US patents. 
Taiwan’s success in international patenting implies that intellectual property laws, 
especially those pertaining to domestic patenting in Taiwan should not be much 
different from the standards adhered by the patenting institutions in developed 
countries. In other words, Taiwan’s long history in international patenting arguably 
makes Taiwan a reliable case for studying domestic patents. Moreover, there are other 
added benefits to use Taiwan patents as opposed to U.S. patents. For example, smaller 
groups in Taiwan may not patent outside Taiwan even though they might be doing a 
lot of innovations. The use of domestic patents thus reduces the selection bias in favor 
of larger groups. The domestic patent database in Taiwan also distinguishes between 
high-novelty innovation and low-novelty innovations. As a robustness check, 
however, I also examine the effects on R&D intensity as an alternative measure.  
Finally, I use business groups as the unit of analyses. As I have discussed earlier, 
business groups within the context of this thesis are similar to multidivisional and 
multiproduct firms However, the use of groups can lead to a potential problem of 
selection bias. In many emerging economies, groups are the ones who have the 
resources to patent. They are also the ones who established the major external 
linkages. Thus the relation between external linkages and innovation can be spurious, 
driven by the common “group” factor. In the case of Taiwan, however, groups tend to 
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have only a small portion of the domestic patents (Mahmood and Singh, 2002), 
suggesting that this problem is less likely in Taiwan. 
4.2 Construction of the panel 
Data for business groups were collected primarily from five editions of the 
directory Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT) (1982, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000), a data 
source used widely by scholars (Khanna and Rivkin 2001, Chung 2001). This 
directory is compiled by China Credit Information Service in Taipei (CCIS), the 
oldest and most prestigious credit-checking agency in Taiwan and an affiliate of 
Standard & Poor of the United States. CCIS started publishing data for the top 100 
business groups (in terms of annual sales) biennially in 1972. For credit checking in 
the private sector, CCIS maintains a database containing more than 30,000 largest 
firms in Taiwan. From this directory, I constructed my first database that record data 
at the group, member firm and individual firm level. At group level, I recorded those 
basic facts such as number of member firms, employees and other financial details 
such as total assets, sales, revenues, change-in-sales, and so on. In total, 512 group-
year entries across five time periods (1981, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998) were included.  
Based on my first database, I built my second database that contains industrial 
patents. From the firm level spreadsheet of 5323 firm-years, I located 3041 
distinguished group firms. I then used this list of firm name as an index to search the 
online patent database maintained by the Intellectual Property Office of Taiwanese 
government. This comprehensive online database covers all patents filed and granted 
in Taiwan since 1950 and is updated every 10 days. In total, 11267 patents are 
identified and this is equal to 4% of the total patents included in the online database. 
The most innovative group filed 6379 patents while 30% of the groups do not have 
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any patent. As shown in Table 1, 97% of the group patents were approved during the 
1980s and 1990s, which correspond with our research time frame from 1981 to 1998. 
For each patent, I coded the patent identification number, the dates of approval, and 
more importantly, the types of patent classified by the Intellectual Property Office. 
According to this classification, I identified two types of patent: 1) New invention, 
designating a wholly new product, material, or manufacturing process; and 2) New 
style, representing a minor modification in the shape or color of a product. The 
availability of categorical data on patent with respect to its quality renders this study 
especially interesting. Table 1 tabulates the patent counts according to the year of 
granting and the type of patents.  
My third database on R&D expenditure supplements the patent database in 
deciphering the dynamics of group innovation. Since group level R&D expenditure 
data are not reported in the BGT directory, I constructed the database by using firm 
level information. I extracted the numbers from the corporate reports of listed 
companies. Since most listed group members are the major firms, the flagships within 
the groups, the R&D value of the core firms is believed to be a good proxy for the 
R&D expenditure at the group level. As companies seldom reported R&D 
expenditure before 1990, I downloaded the amount of R&D expenditure of 388 
companies that are listed in Taiwan’s stock market over the period of 1991-2000. I 
secondly used the list of group firms to check against that of the listed companies and 
identified 108 of them are group members. This transformed into 228 of the 395 
group-years, or about 60% of the entries in years 1990, 1994 and 1998.  
The last database on external linkages is built upon the BGT (1981-1998). In the 
BGT yearbook, every external linkage is documented with the information including 
sources of countries, content of activities and sometimes, the motives of that linkage. 
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Based on this information, I identified four main types of linkages which cover 59 
countries and regions. I further combine these 59 countries into 5 geographic groups, 
i.e. the United States, Japan, Europe, Developing countries, and other countries 
(mainly Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands) to come up with my measure of 
geographic diversification.  My coding procedure is primarily based on a keyword 
searching mode. For example, all linkages with the keyword like ‘collaborative 
venture’, ‘joint venture’, ‘cooperation’, ‘collaboration’ are recorded as a joint 
venture4. The same rule applies to licensing and acquisition. It is important to note 
that in order to capture the precise concept of joint venture, besides the keyword 
searching, I also perform additional equity investment check. Only a linkage 
involving an announcement indicating that the parents had formed a new legal entity 
with equity contributions is coded as joint ventures. This procedure excludes those 
linkages which appear on the book with the literal meaning of ‘collaboration’ but 
actually are contractual in nature. Table 1, 2 illustrate the distribution and changes of 
these linkages across types, regions and years. As I can see from table 2 panel A, the 
share of licensing to the total number of linkages is shrinking (from 44% in 1986 to 
19% in 1998), while that of Joint ventures and acquisition kept growing. The changes 
reflect how Taiwanese business groups move up the technological ladders and 
accomplish their industrialization from OEM to ODM/OBM during the past decades.  
4.3 Model Specification and Measures 
The data on Patent number is typical Count Data. The preponderance of zeros and 
the discrete nature of the dependent variable suggest that I should improve on the 
least squares model approach with a specification that accounts for these 
characteristics. Consequently, Poisson regression model has been widely used to 
study such data. However, the assumed equality of the conditional mean and variance 
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functions is typically taken to be the major shortcoming of the Poisson regression 
model. Many alternatives have been suggested (see Hausman, Hall and Griliches 
1984, Cameron and Trivedi 1986, Gurmu and Trivedi 1994 for detailed discussion). 
The most common is the negative binomial model, which arises from a natural 
formulation of cross-section heterogeneity. The negative binomial model deals with 
cases of over-dispersion where there is more variation than would be expected were 
the process Poisson (Greene 1993). Inasmuch as the wide dispersion of the data on 
patent (standard deviation 41.88 see table 3) suggests the presence of over-dispersion 
problem, I prefer the negative binomial model to Poisson model. 
In theory, the negative binomial model is generalized from Poisson model by 
introducing an individual, unobserved effect into the conditional mean,  
iiiiii xu εαλµ +=+= 'logloglog , 
where the disturbance iε  reflects either specification error as in the classical 
regression model or the kind of cross-sectional heterogeneity that normally 
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Patent and External Linkages are my focal measures. I measure Patents, as the 
count number of approved patent applications, or granted patents, for group i in year t. 
The particular year t is assigned as the application date for each granted patent. For 
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example, a patent filed in 1982 but was granted in 1984 is treated as a 1982 patent. 
This coding procedure reflects the research output by the relevant technological 
efforts. As innovation output, patents thus correspond to the research efforts 
immediately before the patent application. I also use a one-year lead of all the other 
explanatory variables as influences on innovation, such as R&D and external linkages. 
Thus, I regress the patent count for 1982 on the 1981 values of covariates and 
controls such as external linkages.  
I measure external linkages as the share of a particular type of linkage to the total 
number of linkages for group i in year t. Naturally, the absolute number of linkages 
for each type is a more straightforward measure for external linkages. However, if a 
group has a large absolute number but relatively small share of that type of linkages, 
the cross-sectional comparison to another group with a small absolute number but 
large share of that linkage will be highly biased.  Hence, I prefer the share measure to 
the absolute number.2
Size 
A measure of firm size is included to test whether there are inherent advantages 
associated with size. Large groups, it is often argued, tend to be more innovative than 
their smaller counterparts. Reasons for this include scale advantages of large groups; 
a greater likelihood to engage in risky projects; and economies of scope (Cohen 
1996). Larger groups have easier access to financing, can spread the fixed costs of 
innovation over a larger volume of sales and may benefit from economies of scope 
and complementarities between R&D and other manufacturing activities (Baldwin, 
Hanel, Sabourin, 2000). Counter arguments, however, exist to suggest that as firms 
grow large, their R&D becomes less efficient. Levin and Reiss (1988) reviewed the 
                                                 
2 If the total number of external linkages of a group is 0, then the share of each type of external linkages will all be 
treated as 0. This is to avoid the problem of 0 denominator. 
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empirical evidence and observed that it was inconclusive. Economies of scale and 
scope may exist, but may be exhausted long before a firm becomes very large. Size is 
measured here by the total sales of all member firms within that group.  
ROS (Return on Sales) 
Funding for innovation requires capital.  In theory, this capital can be raised either 
internally or externally.  When firms go to the capital market, the sources of funding 
available encompass debt and equity.  Since innovation projects often involve 
irreversible investments towards highly specific assets, debt-financing is not generally 
an option until a firm has collateral or is under-leveraged to begin with.  The other 
available funding sources are either internal cash flows or outside equity.  In countries 
where the capital market is not efficient (i.e., “thin stock markets”), the lack of a 
vibrant market for venture capital implies the need for innovation projects to be 
financed primarily by internal cash flows (Williamson 1988, 1996).   
To the extent that internal financing is the major within-firm resource for innovation 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994, pp. 49), only firms with a high level of liquidity can 
support a sizable R&D effort.  In this chapter, I control for this effect by including a 
group’s sales-weighted average Return on Sales3 as a proxy for its liquidity.4  I expect 
this variable to have a positive coefficient.  
Technological Opportunities 
In this thesis, controlling for unobservable industry-specific effects is critical for 
my study, since the industry-specific effect could be correlated with groups’ ability to 
patent. Technological opportunities differ across industries since the scientific 
                                                 
3 ROS may not be a perfect measure of liquidity. Unfortunately, as far as the data at hand is concerned, we don’t 
have very detailed firm-level financial data. However, we would generally assume that firms with better 
profitability would have larger cash flow. Or at least, firms with low profitability are not likely to have large cash 
flow. This measure would thus partially capture Himmelberg and Peterson (1994)’s internal financing idea. 
4 Since I have firm-level data within each sector, I calculate the group-specific values by taking weight 
averaged firm-specific values within a particular group and weighting by each firm’s share of sales in 
the total group sales. 
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environment provides more fertile ground for advances in some industries than others. 
As a result, the technical advance generated per unit of R&D is greater in some 
industries than others (Cohen 1996). Thus I expect a positive effect of Technological 
opportunities on group patenting. 
Failing to account for industry-specific effect can be viewed as a specification error 
likely to biased estimates of the effects of external linkages. Two proxies for 
technological opportunities that were suggested by Levin et al. (1987) have been used 
in various studies. The first is a measure of the extent to which an industry relies on 
science-based research; while the second measures the extent to which an industry 
relies on external sources of knowledge, such as customers and suppliers, for 
technological advance. In this study, I use the first approach, believing that it comes 
closer to the notion of the technological base that is available to a firm. The second is 
more concerned with the extent of inter-firm knowledge transfer rather than 
differences in the underlying technological environment. 
To capture the first concept, technological opportunity is measured here by 
industry averaged R&D expenditure over sales, i.e. R&D intensity. It must be noted 
that my study is based on group level technological opportunity. In most previous 
studies, technological opportunity is naturally calibrated at industry level or firm level. 
In this thesis, as I focus on the group level innovative performance, an adaptation of 
industry level measure of technological opportunity to group level is thus required. 
As every group is represented by its member firms, therefore, by identifying each 
member firm’s technological opportunity and further taking the weighted average 
with respect to firm sales, a group level technological opportunity is easy to compute. 
Likewise, the group level concentration ratio in the next paragraph also follows.  
                                                                                                                                             
 
 70
The Effects of External Linkages on Innovation 
Concentration Ratio (C5) 
Firms active in highly concentrated markets have been hypothesized to be less 
likely to innovate. Monopoly power, it is claimed, erected entry barriers that handicap 
outside competitors and henceforth naturally secure for firm a niche less vulnerable to 
the potential threats from small companies. Others (Arrow, 1962) have argued that 
the gains from innovation at the margin are larger in an industry that is competitive 
than under monopoly conditions. Moreover, insulation from competitive pressure can 
breed bureaucratic inefficiency (Scherer, 1980). Finally, if market structure is largely 
determined by the life-cycle of an industry and an industry is more atomistic in the 
early stages of the life cycle when innovation is more intensive, I should expect 
innovation to be higher when markets are less concentrated (Baldwin, Hanel and 
Sabourin, 2000).  
As a measure of market structure, the five-firm concentration ratio C5, defined at 
the 13 industry aggregate level, is included as one of the control variables. Empirical 
studies of the Schumpeterian hypotheses often address the relationship between 
market structure and innovation by measuring market structure in terms of the four-
firm, five-firm, or the eight-firm concentration ratio. 5  However, there is little 
empirical consensus on the effects of market concentration on innovation (Cohen and 
Levin, 1989).  There is some agreement, however, that the relationship may vary 
depending on the “technological opportunity” of the industry (Kamien and Schwartz, 
1982, pp. 90).  Due to the difficulty of data collection, my data doesn’t cover certain 
industries such as agriculture and service industries. The resultant group level 
                                                 
5 The implicit assumption of using the concentration ratio as a proxy for market structure is that firms 
possess more monopoly power in more concentrated industry than those in less concentrated industries 
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, pp. 85).  Cash flows generated by the exercise of monopoly power were 
considered by Schumpeter as helpful in coming up with the financial resources required to carry out 
scientific research and development. But with efficient capital markets, market power is neither 
necessary nor sufficient a condition for generating the financial resources necessary for innovation 
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concentration ratio, to a considerable degree, will only reflect the concentration of 
those industries covered by my data. As a result, for those groups who mainly operate 
in service or agriculture industries, their concentration ratios are likely to be biased. 
Fortunately, such groups account for no more than 3% of the total.  
Appropriability  
Firms commercialize new products and processes expecting, in return, certain 
rewards—usually an increase in profits. If inventions are easily copied by competitors, 
there is little incentive to innovate. To protect their innovation from being copied, 
firms use various forms of intellectual property protection, such as patents, trade 
secrets, copyrights, and trademarks. For groups operating in industries where patents 
are relatively ineffective as an appropriability mechanism, groups are less likely to 
take out patents. Instead, groups may simply diversify into the areas opened up by 
their innovations as a way to preempt their rivals from copying and expropriating 
their innovation. Thus, failure to control for effectiveness of patents as appropriability 
mechanism would bias the estimates of external linkages.  
Despite the widespread belief that the existence of intellectual property protection 
is critical to the innovative process, empirical evidence as to the beneficial effects on 
innovative activity is sparse (Cohen 1996). Indeed, there is empirical evidence to 
suggest the opposite. In a study examining the effectiveness of patents in protecting 
intellectual property rights, Mansfield (1986) found that only in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries did patents play an important role. Levin et al. (1987) also 
found that product patents were more important for pharmaceuticals and chemicals. 
Moreover, Levin et al. (1987) found that other forms of intellectual property rights 
protection were perceived by firms to be more effective than patents. Complementary 
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marketing activities and lead-time were found to be the most effective in protecting 
product innovations. For process innovations, patents were found to be much less 
effective, while secrecy was found to be the most effective instrument. Cohen (1996) 
concluded that, although there is evidence of inter-industry differences in 
appropriability conditions, there was little empirical evidence as to the beneficial 
effect of these conditions on innovative activity across a wide range of industries. 
In this thesis, I control for this effect by taking weighted average of industry level 
measures of effectiveness of patents as an appropriability mechanism a-la Cohen, 
Nelson, and Walsh (1997). I expect Appropriability variable to have a positive effect 
on innovation. 
Following the practice of Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (1997), I use their results on 
the effectiveness of patent as one of the mechanism through which firms appropriate 
the returns to their innovations6. This is a direct measure of the extent to which the 
firm found these to be important, or the degree to which it was able to devise a 
strategy to protect its intellectual property. Learning how to do this is not 
straightforward and requires the development of specific competencies—legal skills, 
design skills, marketing and service skills. 
According to Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (1997), the measure of the effectiveness of 
appropriability mechanisms are indicated by the respondents to his questionnaire on 
the percentage of their innovation for which each appropriability mechanism had 
been effective in protecting their firm’s competitive advantage from those innovations 
during the prior three years. There were five response categories: 1.) Less than 10%; 
2.) 10% through 40%; 3.) 41% through 60%; 4.) 61% through 90%; and 5.) Greater 
                                                 
6  Other mechanisms such as, secrecy, leading time, complementary sales and service and 
complementary manufacturing facilities and know-how are discussed in details in Cohen (1997). In line 
with the dependent variable patent counts, the patent mechanism is the most relevant one in capturing 
the appropriability condition. 
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than 90%. Similar to my practice above, to move from the industry-level measure to 
my group-level measure, I further take sales weighted average for each group 
member firm so as to come up with the group-level measure of appropriability.  
Product Diversification and Geographic Diversification 
Diversification is a multi-dimensional concept that is difficult to measure with a 
single index. Traditional Berry-Herfindahl measures of diversification employed by 
industrial organization researchers and the Rumelt categorical measures used by 
strategy researchers have their respective strengths and limitations (Montgomery 
1982). While the Berry-Herfindahl indices are objective as well as simple, easy to 
compute, they do not distinguish between related and unrelated diversification. 
Similarly, while Rumelt’s classification captures the subtleties of a firm’s 
diversification strategy, it is highly subjective and therefore difficult to replicate. 
In this thesis, I use the entropy index, which retains the simplicity of the former 
approach while capturing the essential richness of the latter approach. The entropy 
measure was popularized in economics by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and was 
introduced into the strategy literature by Palepu (1985). In order to calculate the 
entropy index, a 2-digit broad SIC code category and a 3-digit finer product category 
are first identified based on the “Taiwan Industry SIC Code”. 
Suppose a group operates in N industry segments.  If Pi is the share of the ith 
segment in the total sales of the group, the entropy measure of total diversification 
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I also employ the entropy index to measure geographic diversification GD. To 
calculate the entropy measure, following Hirsch and Lev (1971) and Miller and Pras 
(1980), I classified foreign markets into five relatively homogeneous global regions: 
North America, Japan, Europe, developing countries and others7. This classification is 
based on the increasing importance of the regional economies (Ohmae 1985, 1995). 
For example, Morrison and Roth (1992) found that competitive battles were much 
more between regions rather than global in scope. For calculation, I still use the 
above formula. , instead of  in DT, is defined as the share of number of external 
linkages in region i to the total number of linkages in the global market and is the 
weight given to each global region. The measure considers both the number of market 
regions in which a group operates and the relative importance of each market region 
to the group. 
iR iP
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 summarizes the data for Taiwan business groups. The overall mean of New 
Innovation Patent is 3.86. However, the high standard deviation (41.88) suggests 
large variations in patenting among business groups (the total Patents vary from a 
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 793 (“United Microelectronics”)). Following the 
terminology used in panel data analysis, ‘between’ in Table 3 refers to differences in 
group-specific averages across different groups, with the averages taken within a 
group over time. The ‘between’ standard deviation of New Innovation numbers is 
47.25 (with the actual group-specific averages vary from a minimum of 0 to 547 
(“TSMC group”)). Total Patents ‘within’ deviation, measuring the deviation from 
industry-specific averages, is 15.21, much less than ‘between’ variation. Taking a 
                                                 
7 Other countries are mainly Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands. In terms of regional economics, these two 
countries do not fall into any of the other four regions. Generally, Taiwanese established external linkages in these 
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further look at the New Style Patents, I observe that the overall mean of New Style 
Patent is 1.08, accounting for around 25% of the total patents. Thus, it seems that 
business groups in Taiwan are doing more new invention than new style patenting.  
The mean External Linkage (overall) across groups and over time is 1.18. External 
Linkages vary from 0 to 17 (Tatung group). The maximum fluctuation over time in 
total linkages took place also within the Tatung group (4 in 1988 to 17 in 1992).  The 
group level sales-weighted technological opportunities (R&D intensity) doesn’t 
display remarkable variation (standard deviation at 1.7, ranging from 0 to 6.94 (Ever 
Light group)5). Similarly, the sales-weighted mean market concentration ratio is also 
not high (0.21).  
In the correlation matrix, there seems to be high positive correlation between 
Geographic Diversification and Total External Linkages, indicating that for those 
business groups establishing many linkages, these linkages are likely to settle in 
diverse countries as opposed to focus in only several countries. 
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
                                                                                                                                             
two countries to take advantage of the tax privilege. 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Regression Results Using Pooled Estimation 
Table 5 provides pooled regression results on three different dependent variables 
(total number of patents, new invention and new style patents) using Negative 
Binomial Model. In column (2) where new invention is the dependent variable, 
hypothesis 1a, 2b are well supported. Acquisition and Joint venture are both 
significant at 1% statistical level in new invention. Further, Wald-test of the equal 
coefficients between JV and Acquisition in new invention is decidedly rejected at 
0.1% (Chi-square 13.39). This gives strong support to hypothesis 1a and suggests that 
Acquisition is the most efficient in new invention patenting among all types of 
linkages. Now, comparing JV with Licensing in new invention patenting, although 
Wald-test of equal coefficient failed to reject the hypothesis at 10% level (Chi-square 
1.11), the significance of JV in contrast to the insignificance of Licensing still 
moderately suggests that Joint venture is more important than Licensing in new 
invention patenting. On the other hand, the opposite results come by for new style 
patenting in column (3). Licensing turns statistically significant at 1% while Joint 
Venture and Acquisition become no longer significant. Wald-test of equal coefficients 
between Licensing and JV is rejected at 1% (Chi-square 5.97), which supports 
hypothesis 1b and means that Licensing is more effective than JV in low-novelty 
innovation. These results are obtained after controlling for group and industry-
specific factors. Most control variables come out statistically significant with 
expected signs. The comparisons between different types of linkages on different 
types of innovation provide solid support for my hypotheses and complementary 
assets theory. 
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Column (1)-(3) in Table 7 report pooled regression results with interaction terms. 
In column (1), the interaction terms total linkages*geographic diversification and 
total linkages*product diversification are negative and statistically significant at 5% 
(z-stat 2.099, 3.064, respectively). Together with the positive sign of total linkages, 
the above results support hypotheses 3 and 4b. To check the robustness of my results, 
I also differentiate between types of innovation as well. Results in column (2) and (3) 
strengthened my hypotheses. Except geographic diversification in column (2), all 
interaction terms are still negative and statistically significant at 10% or above. The 
insignificance of geographic diversification in new invention patenting suggests that 
geographic diversification might not always negatively moderate the relationship 
between external linkages and innovation. There could be some nonlinearity which is 
not readily discernible in parametric estimation. This gives rise to further 
nonparametric approach to double check the results.  
<<Insert Table 4, 5, 7 about here>> 
5.2 Regression Results Using Panel Estimation 
To tackle the problem of unobserved heterogeneity across groups, I run a random 
effects model using a flexible estimation method for panel data known as the 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) (Liang and Zeger 1986). One of the 
particularly useful features of the GEE approach for random-effects estimates is that 
observations for all subjects are not required to have the same correlation structure.  
Instead, with-group correlation structure can be specified under GEE. Moreover, it 
further allows us to adjust for heteroskedasticity using Huber’s (1967) revision. 
Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) provide an alternative fixed effects estimator for 
count data that tackles with the unobserved heterogeneity by computing within-firm 
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estimates. In this approach, they use the variation within a firm across time to 
estimate the coefficients. However, given that most of the variation in patents in table 
3 appears to be between-group as opposed to within-group, panel data estimation 
techniques like fixed effects models may not add too much extra value. Furthermore, 
the Hausman test fails to reject the random effects model in favor of the fixed effects 
specification. Therefore, in this thesis, the random effects GEE is preferred for panel 
estimation 
 Table 6 reports the regression results using GEE panel estimation. Most my main 
results are consistent with the estimation under the pooled regression except that the 
significance of some control variables slightly suffered. For example, in column (3), 
appropriability is only significant at 10%. This partly suggests that certain tacit 
‘group’ specific factor such as patent protection capability can be very important in 
innovation. In summary, the consistent results demonstrate that after controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneities, my empirical evidences are robust across different types 
of patents as well as different types of external linkages.  
<<Insert Table 6 about here>> 
Column (4)-(6) in Table 7 report the GEE panel estimation of my results with 
interaction terms. Again, except geographic diversification, other results are 
consistent with my pooled estimation. It seems that parametric estimation may have 
problems in dealing with certain complex relationships with nonlinearities. Hence, in 
the next chapter, I employ 3-dimensional nonparametric approach to zoom in this 
empirical puzzle. 
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5.3    Sensitivity Analyses 
5.3.1 Robustness check using R&D intensity.  
One could argue that patents fail to capture the incremental learning aspects. Critics 
against patent data often argue that many firms in Asia usually do not patent their 
technological developments, a result that may lead to a less reliable measure for 
relative technological competence (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). Consequently, I 
check the robustness of the patent-based results using R&D intensity as the dependent 
variable. R&D is an important input into the innovation process. Firms that have 
established an effective R&D program are more likely to innovate for several reasons. 
First, R&D directly creates new products and processes. Second, firms that perform 
R&D are also more receptive to the technological advances made by others (Mowery 
and Rosenberg, 1989). R&D intensity was measured as the ratio of research and 
development expenditures to a firm's total sales (Hill & Snell [1988] used a similar 
measure). Use of this ratio avoided problems of an artificial relationship with firm 
size (measured with firm sales). The R&D intensity ratio is widely used in studies of 
innovation (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hambrick & MacMillan, 1985; 
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988).  
Table 8 provides the pooled OLS and panel regression results with R&D/sales as 
dependent variable. The results are almost consistent with those under new invention 
patenting. In column (1), pooled estimation shows that JV and Acquisition are 
statistically significant at 1% (t-stat 2.1 and 4.18, respectively). However, some 
control variables like sales and ROS are not very significant. In column (2) and (3), 
fixed and random effects model didn’t show strong supporting results. This seems to 
suggest that unobserved heterogeneities can be very strong to overwhelm the linkage 
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effects on innovation. However, econometric estimations like fixed effects models 
that put every single dummy to the equation often tend to lose much useful 
information. Moreover, the assumption that every intercept is a group specific 
constant term in this study could be too strong. For example, even for the same group, 
its member firms can be quite different across different periods. Therefore, the 
between effects estimation which conducts a compromised group means in the 
regression is also reported in column (4).  Results in column (4) are consistent with 
the former conclusions that use output measures of innovation.  As far as the 
incomplete (60%) data on R&D is concerned, these results still provide a stronger test 
for the former inferences on the linkages-innovation relationships. 
<<Insert Table 8 about here>> 
5.3.2 Test of Appropriability Regime. 
According to Teece (1986), the concepts of three types of complementary assets 
are always closely related to the imitation process and the distribution of profits 
between innovator and follower. Therefore, it is important to examine the 
appropriability regimes.   
Under tight appropriability regime where patent or copyright protection is 
efficiently enforced, contractual relations like licensing may well suffice to exploit 
the generic assets that required for innovation (Teece 1986). However, when 
appropriability regime is weak, innovators have to rely more on specialized or co-
specialized assets as opposed to generic assets to accomplish a successful innovation. 
Hence, in the situation of a weak appropriation regime, linkages like licensing which 
only exploit generic assets may not add much value. The rationale here can be 
extended onto the sectoral level. According to Baldwin, Hanel, Sabourin (2000), 
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appropriability will be partially conditioned by the nature of the industry—whether 
the product is sufficiently definable that it can be patented. Therefore, appropriability 
regime not only varies under different institutional settings, but also varies under 
across industries. This allows us to perform a sensitivity test of my results by 
checking how the effect of licensing on innovation will vary under different 
appropriability regimes.  
In this thesis, other than the conventional parametric estimation by including 
interaction terms, I conduct a multivariate kernel regression method6 (Hardle 1991) to 
directly trace the interaction with a 3-dimensional illustration. The strength of the 
multivariate kernel method stems from its non-parametric approach that relaxes all the 
parametric assumptions imposed on the data.   
Figure 3a, 3b show how the appropriability regime at the industry level affects the 
relationship between licensing and group patenting. Figure 3a shows, when groups 
operate mainly in industries where appropriability regime is weak (low levels of 
appropriability), licensing has no effect on new invention patenting; but in industries 
where appropriability regime is tight (high levels of appropriability), licensing has 
positive effects. Similar supporting results also come by for new style patenting in 
figure 3b.  
<<Insert Figure 3a, 3b about here>> 
These results lend further support to my theoretical arguments towards 
complementary assets. The rationale is: if external linkages like licensing do help 
innovation through exploiting generic assets, this effect will only loom large when 
appropriability regime is tight and could thus guarantee the protection of these 
generic assets. By examining the moderating effects of appropriability regime at the 
industry level, I reinforced my hypotheses. 
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6 TESTS OF CAUSALITY 
The parametric and semi-parametric evidence generally points to a positive relation 
between external linkages and innovation. Skeptics, however, could offer several 
arguments against this causality. First, both linkages and innovation can be correlated 
to a third unobserved variable such as the appropriability regime. Second, economists 
argued that firms producing innovation had the motivation to expand their external 
linkages to achieve higher returns on their investments in innovation (Caves 
1982).These theoretical puzzles indicate a potential problem of reverse causality 
when patents are used as a proxy for innovation. As Lalonde (1986) has shown, 
standard econometric techniques for assessing treatment effects in the presence of 
endogeneity or sample selection problems may lead to biased estimates 
In order to tackle the problem of “what causes what,” I apply two recent 
econometric approaches. First, I use the propensity score approach proposed by 
Dehejia and Wahba (1997, 1998) to deal with endogeneity problem in the case of 
non-experimental data. Second, by focusing on the moderating effects of product 
diversification and geographic diversification, I look for evidence of specific 
mechanisms through which external linkages affect innovation, thus providing a 
stronger case for causality (Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
6.1 Propensity Score Approach 
One way to check the causality between external linkages and patenting is to 
directly compare the innovative performance between groups with external linkages 
and groups without external linkages. However, people may argue that if these two 
groups differ from each other in various group-specific or industry-specific 
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characteristics such as size, profitability, technological embeddedness, the direct 
comparison is nothing more than a matter of comparing “orange and apple”. Now, 
use causal notation for causal inference. Let  represent patenting performance for a 
group that increased its external linkages at t+1, and  the performance of a group 
that did not increase its external linkages at t+1. Let E be an external linkage indicator 
that equals one when the group increased external linkages at t+1 and zero otherwise. 
Accordingly, denotes the average patenting performance of groups that 




)0|( 0 =iEPE  the average performance of the 
groups that did not increase linkages at t+1. The effect of interest is that of external 
linkages on the patenting performance of the groups that increased external linkages, 
or put differently, the difference between the patenting performance of the group 
(increased external linkages) and the performances of itself would have had if it did 
not increase external linkages )1|(( 0 =iEPE : 
)1|()1|(| 011 =−=== iiT EPEEPEτ       (1) 
This is the difference between the expected treatment effects on the controlled. 
Since is obviously unobservable, as the group had actually increased 
external linkages, the feasibly computable part instead of (1) is the difference in 
average patenting performance between those groups that increased external linkages 
and those did not: 
)1|( 0 =iEPE
)0|()1|(| 011 =−=== iiT EPEEPEτ       (2) 
The problem, then, is that (2) is necessarily a biased estimator of (1) 
unless )1|()0|( 00 === ii EPEEPE  under random assignment. Basically, most of 
the cause effect identification is actually frustrated by this inherent fact of 
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observational life that is called the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (FPCI), 
i.e.: as long as it is impossible to observe the value of )0|()1|( 01 =−= ii EPEEPE  
on the same unit, it is impossible to observe the effect of E on P (Holland, 1986). 
However, the implicit threaten of FPCI does not necessary force us to give up too 
quickly. Rubin (1974, 1977) proposed a statistical solution to solve this problem. The 
remarkable merit of statistical solution is that it replaces the impossible-to-observe 
causal effect of E on a specific unit with the possible-to-estimate average causal 
effect of E over a population of units. This idea led to the matching methodology of 
propensity score, which is based on the propensity score theorem by Rubin (1974, 
1977), and was further applied into practice by Dehejia and Wahba (1998, 1999). 
Let’s see how the propensity score works. 
According to Dehejia and Wahba (1998, 199), I define the propensity score as the 
probability of assigned treatment conditional on a vector of iid. variables . iX
)|()|1Pr()( iiiii XIEXIXP ==≡       (3) 
According to propensity score theorem, if the treatment assignment is ignorable 
conditional on X, it is also ignorable conditional on the propensity score: 
)(|,|, 0101 iiiiiiii XPEYYXEYY ⊥⇒⊥       (4)  
Rubin (1974, 1977) show that in the non-experimental context, I can identify the 
expected treatment effect on the controlled, by assuming that the assignment to 
treatment or control groups is a function of observable variables. In this case, 
conditional on the observed variables, treatment assignment can be taken to be 
random. Put simply, the theorem implies that observations in the non-experimental 
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samples but with the same propensity score have the same probability distribution of 
the whole vector of observable variables . Therefore, even for non-experimental 
data, I can still attain the maximum comparability between treatment and control 
groups by matching on the propensity score. The unconditional effect can then be 
estimated as the expected treatment effects conditional on the distribution of the 
controlled population: 
iX
}1|)0),(|()1),(|(){(| 011 ==−=== iiii EEXpYEEXpYEXEp iiiTτ   (5) 
Causal Inference 
According to Rubin’s causal inference model, the causal inference may largely rely 
on the role of time if I did succeed in constructing two homogeneous treatment group 
and control group. The reason lies in the fact that when a unit is exposed to a cause, it 
must occur at some specific time or within a specific time period. Variables now are 
divided into two classes: pre-exposure—those whose values are determined prior to 
exposure to the cause; post exposure—those whose values are determined after 
exposure to the cause. The role of a response variable P is to measure the effect of the 
cause, and thus must fall into the post-exposure class. This gives rise to the critical 
element of the model. The values of post-exposure variables are potentially affected 
by the particular cause E, to which the unit is exposed. This is nothing less than the 
statement that causes have effects, which is the very heart of the notion of causation. 
(Holland, 1986) 
Following the above discussion, I propose to construct two ‘quasi-experimenting’ 
treatment and control group with respect to their changes of external linkages. The 
use of changing external linkages allows us to identify the cause of the post-exposure 
variable. Next, the patent count I used is with one-year lag which is a typical post-
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exposure variable indicating the patents that group applied in the next year after it 
increased its current external linkages. In summary, the basic idea of this simple 
causality test is to construct two homogeneous comparable ‘quasi-experimenting 
groups’. A simple algorithm of propensity score method developed by Dehejia and 
Wahba (1998, 1999) is described in the endnotes.7
Tables 9-11 report the comparison results between those groups that increased 
specific type of linkages and those did not under the propensity score methods. I 
focus on the mean of the three types of group patenting, i.e. total patents, new 
invention and new style. In table 9, licensing shows consistent positive effects on new 
style patenting (4 positive vs. 1 negative). The overall difference is statistically 
significant at 10% (t-stat 1.73). On the other hand, the positive effect of licensing on 
new invention patenting is neither consistent (3 negative vs. 2 positive) nor 
significant (t-stat 1.098). These two results are consistent with my findings in the 
pooled and panel regression estimations.  Table 10 reports the results of Joint venture 
on group patenting. Joint venture displays overwhelming positive effects (6 positive 
vs. 2 negative) on new invention patenting and the overall difference is statistically 
significant at 5% (t-stat 2.121). Expectedly, the effect of JV on new style patenting is 
almost invisible (t-stat -0.3, 5 negative vs. 3 positive). This result also supports my 
findings in the parametric model. Finally, the acquisition results, however, seem a bit 
mixed. In Table 11, the positive effect of acquisition on new invention patenting is 
not consistent (3 positive vs. 2 negative). However, in spite of this inconsistency, the 
overall difference still displays statistical significance at 5% (t-stat 2.07). Given the 
smaller sample compared to the JV and Licensing, this result still moderately 
supports my previous findings.  
The general findings here mean that after I constructed two quasi-experimental 
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control and treatment groups, the increase of one specific type of external linkages in 
the treatment group will generally bring about more corresponding patents than the 
control group. For example, the increase of joint venture in time t will bring about 
roughly 2.7 more new invention patents at time t+1, but have almost no effect on new 
style patents.  
<<Insert Table 9-11 about here>> 
The propensity score method shows that after I constructed two homogeneous 
experimenting treatment and control group controlling for all group-specific and 
industry-specific factors, each type of external linkage has a significant positive effect 
on a particular type of patenting. Meanwhile, the patent counts I used are with 1 
year’s lag, which means that the group performance of patenting is an ex-post effect 
of external linkages. The combination of these two results suggests the a priori 
positive effect of external linkages on patenting rather than the reverse. 
6.2 Interaction Variable Approach 
Another way to make progress on causality is to focus on the details of theoretical 
mechanisms though which external linkages may influence innovation, and document 
their working. Rajan and Zingales (1998) uses this approach in examining the effects 
of financial development on growth. I also make an attempt to do that. 
While my theories regarding the moderating effects of geographic and product 
diversification apply to all types of external linkages, I thus conduct the tests by 
focusing on the total number of external linkages.  
Figure 1a illustrates how the effect of total external linkages on patenting varies 
with different levels of geographic diversification (GD). Overall, the moderating 
 88
The Effects of External Linkages on Innovation 
effect of geographic diversification is negative. At low levels of geographic 
diversification, the effect of total external linkages on patenting is positive (with some 
nonlinearity); but at high levels of GD, total linkages have no effect on patenting any 
more. This result is consistent with the parametric estimations with interaction terms. 
The nonlinearity displayed in figure 1a, 1b explains why some of the parametric 
results with interaction terms are not significant. It also implies the reason why 
previous empirical evidences on the moderating effects of geographic diversification 
can be decidedly mixed. Whereas there is nonlinearity at low levels of GD, failing to 
include high order terms in the parametric model often leads to misspecification 
problems. To check the robustness of the results, I further differentiate between types 
of innovation. In figure 1b, results on new invention patents are similar to that on 
total patents. Further, figure 1c suggests clear negative moderating effects of 
geographic diversification. When linkages are monotonously positive at low levels of 
GD, they become overwhelmingly negative at high levels of GD. The above results 
tend to favors the negative hypothesis 4b.  
The empirical evidences show that though external linkages may help innovation, 
this positive effect tapers off when geographic diversification is high. Moreover, in 
the theory development section, I have showed that, specifically, geographic 
diversification will suppress groups in exploiting complementary assets. Hence, if 
external linkages do a priori help innovation, this effect is expected to vary with 
different levels of geographic diversification which characterize different extents of 
groups in the exploitation of complementary assets. This provides an alternative way 
to justify the direction of causality. 
Next, in Figure 2, I examine the moderating effect of product diversification (PD) 
on linkage-innovation. In figure 2a, hypothesis 3 on the negative moderating effects 
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of product diversification is supported. Total external linkages have some positive 
effects on innovation when product diversification is low, but have almost no effect 
when product diversification is high. Similar as that in GD, I further differentiate 
between types of innovation to check the robustness of my results. In new invention 
patenting (Figure 2b), I get almost similar results as in total patents; in new style 
patenting (Figure 2c), the negative moderating effects of PD is even clearer. The 
prevalent positive effect of external linkages on new style patenting fades away with 
the growing level of product diversification. Therefore, to the extent that product 
diversification breeds risk and brings about diminishing capabilities of exploiting 
complementary assets, external linkages become impotent to help innovation. By 
scrutinizing one of the underlying channels—complementary assets—by which 
external linkages help innovation, the moderating effect of product diversification 
provides a stronger test of causality. 
In summary, the 3D contour not only reinforced my previous theoretical argument, 
but also allows us to trace the detailed course of how the effect of linkages on 
innovation varies across different structural and institutional context. The ability of 
3D multivariate kernel regression in detecting the potential non-linearity among 
complex interactions demonstrates its incomparable edges over the conventional 
parametric methods.  
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I conducted an empirical study on the effects of cross border external 
linkages on innovation. The empirical evidence based on primary data from Taiwan 
suggests three major findings. First, in general, cross border external linkages help 
innovation, but this effect may vary across different types of linkages. Second, the 
effect of cross border external linkages on innovation also varies across different types 
of innovation. Third, it is cross border external linkages that in the first place help 
innovation rather than the reverse. These results are robust to the use of patents as well 
as R&D.  
7.1 Contribution of this thesis 
The apparent implications of the this study is that companies cannot be regarded as 
independent units that can chose counterparts at any time, but rather as units 
interlocked with each other, constituting highly specialized and complex structures. 
Earlier, the border of the company was seen as the dividing line between cooperation 
and conflict-cooperation within the company and conflict in relation to all external 
units. The corresponding means for coordination are hierarchy and the market 
mechanism. The existence of relationships makes this picture much more diffuse. 
There are great opportunities for cooperation with a lot of external units forming, for 
example, coalitions. Thus, it is often more fruitful to see the company as a part of 
network of linkages instead of a free and independent actor in an atomistic market. 
This thesis contributes to the internationalization theories. Specifically, my 
empirical findings are partly in line with Mowery’s argument that Joint ventures are 
more important in technological innovation than licensing. However, I further show 
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that, this is only the case when an innovation is new enough, in the sense that it 
requires the firm to process quite different kinds of information. Whenever, an 
innovation is only incremental, licensing, contrarily, displays higher viability than any 
other types of external linkages like joint ventures and acquisitions. My empirical 
findings reflect the technological development path in emerging economies.  The 
shifting concentration from the earlier licensing to later joint venture and acquisition 
was abreast with the evolvement of manufacture patterns of late-industrialized firms 
from OEM to ODM and OBM. 
This thesis also enriched Teece’s complementary assets theory in combining it with 
types of innovation and types of external linkages. In his seminal work, Teece (1986) 
extends his complementary assets theory under different appropriability regime. In 
brief, he explains the reason why certain firm could extract more commercial return 
than other firms may at least partially, attributable to the different appropribility 
regime embedded in different industries or different institutional settings. However, 
he didn’t explain why in the same industry, some firms can be more successful in 
terms of innovation than others. My study thus goes a step further and level the 
complementary assets theory down to firm level and group level. I show that firms’ 
abilities to exploit complementary assets are different with respect to different types 
of external linkages they formed. Moreover, the exploitation of complementary assets 
can be further moderated and affected by other factors like product diversification 
and geographic diversification. In another dimension, certain complementary asset 
only pertains to specific type of innovation. This multi-dimension study on types of 
external linkages and types of innovation gives a better understanding on how 
firm/group employs external linkages to innovate. 
This study also helps to settle the theoretical and empirical debate on geographic 
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diversification. New external resources are not equally available everywhere. 
Especially in certain industries, where diverse input is required, access to these 
diverse resources may sometimes constitute a critical competitive advantage, adding 
further inducements to the geographical diversification also of advanced research 
activities. However, counter arguments assert that in industries of high technological 
opportunities, some ‘pockets-of-innovation’ have emerged, where universities and 
other public research institution play an important role. Geographic diversification 
may actually fall into divergence of technology focus and lose competitiveness. My 
empirical evidences generally favor the latter argument. This might be especially the 
case in emerging economies. 
I raised challenges on existing studies on regional network of linkages. The main 
critique towards the regional network approach is that these studies erroneously 
regard external sources as uniform as regional interfirm relationship. Admittedly, 
while contractual relationships like licensing are loose in nature, joint ventures and 
acquisition encompassing equity commitment and long-term strategic goal cannot be 
criticized with the same arguments. Scholars like Bianchi and Bellini (1991), claims 
that localized inter-firm networks take advantage of trust which is well suited for 
communication of informal tacit knowledge. Such trust and candor requires proximity, 
common culture, and even ‘clan’ relationship which are not typically characteristics 
of external linkages. However, such universal trust may become unnecessary when 
secrecy requirements in defense contracting drastically reduce appropriation 
uncertainties and information leakage (Markusen 1990). As Camagni (1990) shows, 
well-established and successful cross-border linkages can be a means of overcoming 
such appropriation uncertainties induced from the constraints of territory and 
topographic space. My studies reinforced this conclusion with empirical evidences 
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showing that appropriately chosen type of external linkages can be alternatives to 
regional network of linkages to create new technological innovation. 
Finally, this thesis also serves to settle some empirical puzzles towards external 
linkages. While theorists like (Caves, 1982, Kamien and Schwartz 1982) provide 
counter arguments that it was innovation in the first place create the incentives for 
firms to establish external linkages, the propensity score causality test shows that 
after constructing two quasi-experimental groups, the treatment group who increase 
their external linkages generally have better innovative performance in the next year 
than the control group who did not increase their external linkages. Moreover, the 
indirect approach of underlying channels further shows that external linkages may 
influence innovation, at least partially, through the capabilities of exploiting 
complementary assets. The a priori cause of external linkages on innovation may 
have important managerial and policy implications for top management team and 
government authorities. How to properly formulate the international linkages 
strategies thus constitutes a critical topic for firms, groups and even industries and 
nations to sustain competitiveness through innovation. 
Another puzzle is related the technological licensing. My theoretical arguments on 
complementary assets motivate some doubts on existing literatures and empirical 
evidences about external linkages. In this thesis, my main explanation of the positive 
effect of linkages on innovation hinges on linkages’ abilities to exploit different kinds 
of complementary assets. Therefore, to the extent that linkages like licensing takes 
advantage of exploiting generic complementary assets required by incremental (low-
novelty) innovation, its positive effect on high-novelty innovation is limited. The 
reason why most past researchers generally found positive effect of licensing on 
innovation may, at least partly, attribute to their choosing of institutional context in 
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developed economies where appropriability regime is relatively tight. As Teece (1986) 
shows, under a weak appropriability regime, innovators have to rely more on 
specialized or co-specialized assets as opposed to generic assets to accomplish a 
successful innovation. Hence, linkages like licensing which only exploit generic assets 
may not add much value for groups in emerging economies where appropriation 
problems are rampant. 
This research also provides some clues to the puzzles regarding acquisition. During 
1980s and 1990s, US firms have been highly attracted to acquisition. The number of 
acquisition has grown successively during that period. Coupled with such growing 
number of acquisition is an epidemic loss of competitiveness and innovativeness of 
most firms. The evidence suggests that the value added by acquisitions is, at best, 
controversial. Although some research shows that the target (acquired) firm 
shareholders gain value from the acquisition, the value of acquisitions for acquiring 
firm shareholders varies closed around zero (Hitt et al. 1991, Harrison el al. 1991). It is 
not uncommon for acquired firms to be divested in the years following an acquisition. 
A recent study found that almost one-third of the acquired firms are eventually 
divested, suggesting that a number of acquisitions may not perform well (Hitt et al. 
1990). Of course, there are many potential reasons. For example, the original 
acquisition price paid may have been excessive. Also the newly acquired firm may be 
poorly integrated into the acquiring firm or ineffectively managed after the acquisition. 
However, one thing worth noting is that, along with the growing number acquisition, 
many of these acquisitions often involved unrelated or related product diversification. 
This study shows that even though acquisition will provide better conditions for 
innovation, product diversification negatively moderates firm’s ability to take 
advantage of these privileges. Whenever, innovation is generally considered to be one 
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essential way of maintaining sustained competitiveness, the overuse of acquisition 
accompanied with high degree of product diversification may be, at least partially, 
attributable to the declining of competitiveness of many US firms during the period of 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
7.2 Implications of this thesis 
Apart from the above theoretical contributions, this study also has important 
managerial and policy implications. 
7.2.1 Managerial implications 
Despite the continued importance of in-house R&D, business groups in emerging 
economies are establishing increasing number of external linkages abroad. Moreover, 
these external linkages take a variety of forms ranging from technological licensing to 
joint venture and acquisition. This study of different types of external linkages and 
innovation has important implications for corporate managers.  
First, as firms in emerging economies become technologically more developed, 
their choice of optimal linkage might evolve. For example, the benefits from 
acquisition might outweigh the benefits from licensing when a firm is close to the 
frontier.  By examining the role of different types of linkages on innovation, this 
thesis thus provides managers in emerging economies with practical insights 
regarding which type of linkage options to choose.  
The second layer of managerial concern is with the organizational structure of 
business groups. Traditionally, within a business group, the family centered 
ownership structure formed a strict hierarchical decision making pattern. Most 
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significant oversea expansion decisions were taken by the core firm within that group.  
In order to avoid the costs and difficulties of coordination, it was kept to a minimum. 
This was a feasible policy as long as the external linkages volumes were small and 
mostly devoted to local market adaptations. Over time, this dominant structural 
configuration has increasingly evolved into new organizational forms. For example, 
in a so-called ‘network model’, an organization is constituted by specialized foreign 
external sources sharing the task of developing core technological capabilities, 
sometimes without a clear superior center. In the traditional hierarchical structure, 
external linkages were mostly associated with technical support and local market 
adaptation. The corporate portfolio of technologies was planned and controlled in the 
core firm. In contrast, the network model is associated with decentralized planning 
and control, technological specialization and diversity. Many units contribute to the 
technological competitiveness of the corporation.  
At the group level, geographical and organizational decentralization of external 
linkages creates new needs for coordination, communication and control in order to 
ensure the direction, efficiency and effectiveness of technological progress. Systems, 
procedures and organizational structures must be designed to overcome cultural, 
organizational and geographical barriers in order to ensure cooperation and a smooth 
flow of information between units. There is, thus, a great need for enhancing 
managers’ understanding of these issues.  
The evolution of multinational companies towards increasingly intricate network 
of linkages entails new and central managerial challenges. These issues concern not 
only the planning, coordination and logistics of large and complex flows of 
technology, finance, people and materials, but more fundamentally, the nature of the 
process by which strategy is formulated and implemented. External sources in an 
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integrated network structure are characterized by wide geographical and 
organizational dispersion of technical capabilities and resources. The setting of a 
long-term strategic cooperation between two parties for the evolution of core external 
sources does not necessarily guarantee equitable benefits to both parties; nor does the 
mutual pursuit of new technical capabilities easily constitute the shared long-term 
strategic goal. To a significant extent, integration of strategic efforts must instead rely 
on shared values and visions as expressed in strong corporate cultures, a widely 
shared awareness of central goals and strategies. With regard to different duration of 
external linkages, managers need to be cautious towards their choice of different 
types of linkages as their innovation strategy. 
Nevertheless, internationally decentralized organization means that the need for 
centralization of the control over the corporate technology portfolio increases. 
International coordination means not only having corporate-wide information on the 
technology portfolio and R&D activities and managing different professional 
subcultures but also bridging different corporate subcultures as well as country 
cultures. International coordination also means that people have to meet to exchange 
ideas and information. Corporate technology management has to establish ways and 
means also for informal coordination and international training. 
The last issue confronting managers is how to balance internal and external 
development work against each other. In order to be an attractive counterpart in 
technical development cooperation the company has to have a certain minimum of 
internal development resources that are considered valuable by potential counterpart. 
The ‘right’ balance between the use of internal and external resources, however, can 
be quite different form company to company due to varying internal as well as 
external factors. 
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7.2.2 Policy implications 
The questions discussed previously are of importance to politicians and 
governmental units dealing with aggregates of companies and groups at the industry 
or nation level from a technological development point of view. There is little doubt 
that cross-border linkage is an area of legitimate policy concern, especially for 
national governments as well as policy-making bodies. Interest in these types of 
policies has increased substantially among politicians during the last ten years due to 
the rapid structural changes in many mature industries and accompanying regional 
crises. The successful cases of Taiwan, Korean and Japan show what active and 
coordinated national policy-making can do for reaping the national economic benefits 
of technology (Dunning 1992, Freeman 1987). In line with this idea, a new notion of 
‘national systems of innovation’ has been developed by Freeman, Lundvall and 
Nelson (see Dosi et al. 1988) with the belief that national institutional structures, 
policy environments, industrial organizations, traditions, etc. impact economic 
performance (Patel and Pavitt 1992, Porter 1990).  
A first policy implication concerns with the difficulties of managing external 
linkages with sufficient precision, at least on the present grounds of knowledge about 
external linkages. For one thing, corporate investment decisions in the target of type 
and geographic sources of external linkages are usually made depending on factors 
not merely the technology embeddedness, but other information channels as well as 
environmental factors and basic infrastructures, e.g. marketing and production. 
Dunning (1992) in particular has demonstrated that the effect of the same type of 
external linkage on the national economy may vary depending on the discrepancies of 
the development levels between the host and home countries. For example, when a 
local company in a less developed economy acquired advanced technologies or R&D 
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resources from a foreign collaborative partner in a developed economy, the local 
company could simply take advantage of their local opportunity cost and uses these 
resources to outcompete the local industry with no positive restructuring effects on 
the local economy. The situation is further detrimental if the supply of qualified 
scientists and engineers in the host country is scarce and local competitors are small 
but growing. For emerging economies like Taiwan whose most domestic companies 
are characterized as small and fast growing, this is especially a concern for policy 
makers. One of the policy action, as suggested by Granstrand and Sjolander (see 
Freeman 1987), is that government could direct those large technologically advanced 
MNCs to acquire small, technology-based firms in ways that significantly stimulate 
the subsequent growth and innovativeness of the small firm within the organization of 
the larger MNC. Consequently, cautions should be exercised when formulating 
general policy recommendations in this context. At the same time this points to the 
general need to develop methodologies for policy analysis and policy evaluation that 
take situational variations sufficiently into account.  
The second implication for policy-making concerns with facilitating the 
communication and relevance between two collaborative parties. In fact, the 
management of cross-border external linkages is by far more difficult than that of 
regional linkages or internal linkages. Although governments in emerging economies 
always try to encourage such cross-border external linkages through favorable 
policies, many of the policies showed limited efficiency. For example, it is shown that 
R&D tax credits and other R&D subsidies by governments have very limited effects, 
partly because they are launched on a limited scale and do not linkage strongly into 
corporate decision-making regarding R&D (Granstrand et al. 1992). In order for such 
cooperative interactions to give positive host country effect, their suitable 
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interaction—directly or indirectly through related production or marketing—with 
local industry and local science & technology infrastructure must be ensured. As has 
been pointed out by Dunning (1992), a prerequisite for mutual beneficial interaction 
to take place is that the national science & technology infrastructure and the whole 
national system of innovation have a sufficient degree of development and strength. 
To accomplish this is indeed an important task for national policy-making, which 
involves building up effective institutions for science & technology education at all 
levels, to build up local technology capabilities to scan, acquire, absorb, refine and 
exploit foreign resources and technology, to sustain frontier research capabilities, to 
provide effective mechanisms for domestic technology transfer and to provide an 
environment conducive to technology-based innovation and entrepreneurship 
(Granstrand et al. 1992).  
7.3 Limitations 
7.3.1 Theoretical limitation 
Although in this thesis, I mentioned the concept of network, I didn’t actually 
include any theoretical and empirical analysis of networks. What I concerned in this 
thesis is simple direct linkage between local company and foreign partners. However, 
in reality, linkages not only exist between local and foreign parties, but also exist 
between two foreign parties. An interfirm linkage can cover complex interweaved 
communications between multiple firms with many indirect contacts (Haunschild, 
1993, Mizruchi, 1989, Gulati, 1995, Davis 1991). A firm’s partners may have many 
other partners that may bring their technologies and experiences to the original focal 
firm through indirect interactions (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999). One firm’s linkages, in 
this context, are not restricted to the knowledge acquired from the firm’s immediate 
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partner but also from its partner’s partners (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999). For example, 
business groups in Taiwan often utilized tax privilege in certain countries like 
Cayman and Virgin Islands to perform trans-national investment and third party 
acquisition. With the mushrooming of information technology, communications and 
linkages between two foreign ventures have shown viability in information 
coordination. In industries where technological pace is swift, the ‘networks’ formed 
through both direct and indirect linkages constitute an important structural issue in 
affecting technological innovation. As Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) show, 
the interfirm network can function as information channels to facilitate knowledge 
transfer and exchange between firms. Unfortunately, these indirect linkages are not 
easily perceivable and countable within the capability of current research. 
There is another layer of concern with the linkages. Knowledge flows among firms 
and industries not only through formal knowledge transfers but also through 
relatively informal knowledge spillovers or leakages (Jaffe 1986, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
and Henderson, 1993, Bernstein and Nadiri 1989). Nevertheless, the uncertainties 
inherent in technological development often inhibit the effectiveness of formal 
instruments for planning, coordination, control and information exchange. Successful 
innovation often requires new combinations of skills and expertise that are difficult or 
impossible to foresee. Here, informal personal networks play a fundamental role. 
Granovetter (1973) stresses the importance of such informal weak linkages. For this 
reason and because they play a vital role in facilitating information exchange built on 
mutual trust and respect, measures such as corporate wide conferences and rotation of 
personnel are increasingly important to promote the development of informal 
networks spanning countries, culture, functions and scientific/technical disciplines. 
However, the extensive research on these informal linkages actually goes beyond the 
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scope of this thesis. In addition, such supra-linkage data is not readily measurable and 
available within my current research agenda. 
In this thesis, I generally focus on three broad categories of external linkages. 
However, joint venture itself might differ in their exploitation of learning and 
absorptive capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) and in the importance of 
cooperative relationship (Imai and Baba 1989). For example, Foray (1991) shows that 
even unanimously categorized as joint venture, a joint venture without specific 
facilities may have quite different theoretical meaning from a joint corporation with 
their own facilities. Wakasugi (1988) suggests that the former is not fundamentally 
different from internal coordination, even though called ‘joint’. It seems that the 
broad categorization of joint venture itself in the first place is not unproblematic. In 
this context, the recognition of the dynamic nature of collaborative linkage and the 
transfer and exploitation of learning within the linkages is also important. 
Finally, the unit of analysis in this thesis is at the group level. However, some could 
argue that although business groups in Taiwan are similar to multidivisional firms in 
many ways, they are still different in important ways. For example, when ownership 
structure is not centralized in the control of the family members, internal linkages 
may not operate efficiently. Moreover, group structures are not uniform. Some groups 
take on hierarchical structures while others adopt more parallel structures. Such 
structural discrepancies will necessarily lead to different internal coordination 
patterns, which as a result makes group not like M-form firm. One partial solution to 
these problems is to carefully choose the empirical settings. In this thesis, I choose 
Taiwanese business groups, generally known as family owned, with strong internal 
linkages, to minimize the first concern. But, within the scope of this paper, I am not 
able to take care of the internal organizational structure concern. This could be one of 
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my future research areas. 
7.3.2 Empirical limitation 
In this thesis, I use the number of external linkages in coming up with my major 
measure of focal variable. An apparent doubt can be why not use sales weighted 
measure. From one hand, the direct sales of each linkage involved are not available 
due to the limitation of my data source; on the other hand, this problem may not be 
that serious as long as the external linkages in question are comparable in scales. 
Fortunately, as too small scale overseas activities usually will not be reported in BGT 
yearbook, this procedure actually eliminates the possibilities that trivial overseas 
involvements are also included in my data. Therefore, this possible incomparability 
problem has actually been well mitigated within the reasonable range of statistical 
tolerance. 
Another empirical limitation is relevant to my group-level unit of analysis. At the 
group level, many firm-level control variables have to be adapted and weighted to 
come up with the group level measure. Such adaptation breeds potential 
underestimation problem. For example, while small entrants and R&D firms are often 
attached great importance in innovation, the sales weight measure tends to undercut 
their contribution in technological advances. Such problem could be further 
exacerbated in cases of those groups whose major innovations are carried out in small 
affiliated firms.  
7.4 Future research agenda 
A natural research topic after the type of external linkages is the sources of external 
linkages. Not only the effects of external linkages will vary across different types, it is 
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also supposed to vary across different geographic sources of linkages. For example, 
as Mowery (1992) shows, the participation of US has contributed to the growth of 
international collaborative ventures between US and foreign firms in the development 
and commercialization of new technologies. Cantwell (1992) found evidences that 
collaborative ventures with the participation of UK and some smaller European 
countries have been considerably more involved in internationalizing technological 
research than those with US and Japan. According to a study of Amsden (2001), 
technical cooperation agreements between Japanese companies and companies from 
emerging economies frequently did not really involve much technology transfer. As 
the study suggested, there was more evidence of “show-how” than transfer of “know-
how”. Japan viewed technical cooperation as a means to penetrate the Taiwan 
economy, often using such agreements as a means to “linkage-up” local firms by 
requiring tem to buy parts, components, or raw materials from the technology 
supplier or another equity-related firm from Japan operating in the domestic economy. 
Various evidences of studies demonstrate that geographic sources of linkages also 
matters in technological innovation for companies from emerging economies. Future 
research might be directed to an added dimension of external linkages.  
One interesting future research might be directed to mode of entry. As another hot 
topic in the study of international business, mode of entry is a big question. Why 
certain firms choose one type of entry as opposed to others? The study in this thesis 
motivates an important aspect in the mode of entry, i.e. the appropriability regime of 
the host country. According to Teece (1986), appropriability regime will have direct 
impact on the function of types of complementary assets. Therefore, the host 
country’s appropriability regime can be a decisive factor for multinational companies 
in their choice of entry. 
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In recent years, there is a wave of escalating R&D spending at product, firm and 
country levels not only in industrialized countries but also in emerging economies. 
The mounting R&D spending increases the pressure on technology managers to be 
more cost conscious. One of the means to balance the R&D cost could be seeking 
external sources by linking with foreign partners. However, among factors behind 
increased R&D spending are increased technology diversity at product, firm and 
industry levels. Therefore, how to use the proper type of external linkages can be 
another future research topic. 
Finally, more research is needed on the microeconomic causes of increased 
domestic and international collaboration in research and technology development. I 
know relatively little, for example, about the causes (or even the rate) of escalation in 
the costs of technology development and commercialization, although this escalation 
surely contributes to growing collaboration in the international and domestic spheres. 
The phenomenon of technological convergence is also widely remarked but rather 
less widely measure, analyzed, or understood. Better understanding of the causes and 
implications of international collaborative ventures will require analysis of these and 
other conditioning factors. 
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Table 1: Patent Types by Year 1950-2000 
 
The sample is based on the firm level spreadsheet of 5323 firm-years, from which I 
located 3041 distinguished group affiliated firms. I then used this list of firm name as 
an index to search the online patent database maintained by the Intellectual Property 
Office of Taiwanese government. This comprehensive online database covers all 
patents filed and granted in Taiwan since 1950 and is updated every 10 days. In total, 
11267 patents are identified and this is equal to 4% of the total patents included in the 
online database. For each patent, I coded the patent identification number, the dates of 
approval, and more importantly, the types of patent classified by the Intellectual 
Property Office. According to this classification, I identified two types of patent: 1) 
New invention, designating a wholly new product, material, or manufacturing process; 
and 2) New style, representing a minor modification in the shape or color of a product.  
 
 
Year New Invention New Style Missing Total Percentage
Before 1981 84 275 46 405 4% 
1982-1986 135 228 --- 363 3% 
1987-1990 176 599 --- 775 7% 
1991-1994 452 744 --- 1196 11% 
1995-1998 2172 756 --- 2928 26% 
1999-2001 4758 842 --- 5600 50% 
Total 7777 3444 46 11267 --- 
Percentage 69% 31% --- --- 100% 
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Table 2: Distribution of External Linkages across Types, Geographic Regions and 
Years 
 
The coding of external linkages is built upon the Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT) 
(1981-1998). From the BGT yearbook, I identified four main types of linkages 
(Licensing, Joint Venture, Acquisition and others (mainly marketing agencies)) which 
cover 59 countries and regions. I further combined these 59 countries into 5 
geographic groups, i.e. the United States, Japan, Europe, Developing countries, and 
other countries (mainly Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands) to come up with my 
measure of geographic diversification. Panel A and B illustrate the distribution and 
changes of these linkages across types, regions and years. For example, panel A 
shows the decreasing share of licensing as well as the increasing share of Joint 




Panel A: (types of external linkages) 
 
  Licensing JV Acquisition Other Total
 No. Share No. Share No. Share No. Share No. 
1981 29 37% 44 56% 4 5% 1 1% 78 
1986 60 44% 49 36% 13 9% 15 11% 137 
1990 98 36% 119 43% 14 5% 45 16% 276 
1994 66 30% 99 45% 19 9% 38 17% 222 
1998 19 19% 65 65% 10 10% 6 6% 100 
Total 272 33% 376 46% 60 7% 105 13% 813 
Note: most other types are marketing agencies from which Taiwanese business 




Panel B: (geographic regions of external linkages) 
 
 U.S. Japan Developing Europe Other Total
 No. Share No. Share No. Share No. Share No. Share No.
1981 30 38% 20 26% 21 27% 7 9% 0 0% 78 
1986 43 31% 45 33% 20 15% 25 18% 4 3% 137
1990 70 25% 70 25% 68 25% 63 23% 5 2% 276
1994 36 16% 47 21% 87 39% 44 20% 8 4% 222
1998 19 19% 10 10% 55 55% 6 6% 10 10% 100
Total  198 24% 192 24% 251 31% 145 18% 27 3% 813
Note: most other geographic regions are Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands where 
Taiwanese business groups established companies for third-party investments. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix and Panel Summary (N=512) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1.Invention 1.000              
2.Style 0.012 1.000            
          
          
         
        
          
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
3.Linkages (all) 0.022 0.021 1.000 
4.Licensing8 0.076 0.09* 0.39* 1.000 
5.JV -0.034 -0.011 0.39* -0.15* 1.000 
6.Acquistion 0.15* -0.01 0.14* -0.067 -0.044 1.000 
7.Sales 0.08* 0.050 0.077 0.030 0.035 0.024 1.000 
8.ROS 0.034 0.007 0.056 0.015 0.045 0.063 0.030 1.000
9.Techopp 0.12* 0.079 0.09* 0.09* 0.022 0.012 0.011 0.010 1.000
10.Appropriability 0.069 0.050 0.10* 0.11* 0.09* 0.007 -0.13* -0.018 0.39* 1.000
11.Concen (C5) -0.09* -0.11* 0.10* 0.13* 0.065 0.010 -0.12* 0.046 -0.17* 0.064 1.000
12.GeoDiv 0.023 0.018 0.74* 0.28* 0.35* 0.14* 0.024 0.050 0.065 0.073 0.09* 1.000
13.ProDiv -0.10* -0.002 0.043 0.027 0.074 0.008 0.23* 0.011 -0.060 -0.13* 0.049 0.033 1.000
Mean (overall) 3.86 1.08 1.18 0.17 0.25 0.04 18408 3.92 1.95 20.28 0.21 0.12 0.30
SD.Overall 41.88             
             
             
6.76 2.00 0.34 0.40 0.17 36575 30.09 1.71 12.47 0.16 0.23 0.20
SD.Between 47.25 6.30 1.25 0.23 0.33 0.12 24636 43.11 1.57 12.77 0.13 0.17 0.18
SD.Within 15.21 3.92 1.47 0.25 0.27 0.12 22255 6.95 1.14 3.95 0.13 0.16 0.09
* = significant at p<0.05 or better in a two-tailed test 
                                                 
8 The licensing here is the share of number of licensing to the total number of external linkages; and the same for JV and Acquisition. For details, see section 4.3, page 81 
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Table 4: Summary of Results 
Hypotheses Results Statistical Significance 
Hypothesis 1a Supported Wald test of Licensing=Acquisition: Chi-sq 
13.39 (p<0.001) 
Wald test of JV=Acquisition: Chi-sq 16.79 
(p<0.0001) 
 
Hypothesis 1b Supported Wald test of Licensing=JV: Chi-sq 5.97 
(p<0.001) 
Wald test of Licensing=Acquisition: Chi-sq 
2.13 (p<0.1) 
 
Hypothesis 2a Supported New style: Licensing coefficient 1.775, Z-
stats 3.23 
New Invention: Licensing coefficient 0.51, Z-
stat 0.85 
 
Hypothesis 2b Supported  New invention: Acquisition coefficient 4.82, Z-
stat 5.18 
New style: Acquisition coefficient 0.99, z-stat 
1.19 
 
Hypothesis 3 Supported  Z-stat -3.064 (p<0.01) 
 
Hypothesis 4a Not supported  
 
Hypothesis 4b Supported  Z-stat -2.099 (p<0.05) 
 
Test of causality   
Propensity score 
on Licensing 
Supported New invention: 3(+) vs. 2(-) t-stat 1.098 
New style: 4(+) vs. 1(-), t-stat 1.74 (p<0.1) 
 
Propensity score 
on Joint Venture 
Supported New invention: 6(+) vs. 2(-) t-stat 2.12 
(p<0.05) 





Supported New invention: 3(+) vs. 2(-) t-stat 2.07 
(p<0.05) 
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Table 5: Effects of External Linkages on Group Patenting (Pooled regression 
using Negative Binomial Model) 
 
I regress three types of patents on three types of external linkages as well as other 
controls at the group level. The three types of external linkages, licensing, Joint 
venture and acquisition represent their respective share to the total number of 
linkages. The three dependent variables, total patents (sum of new invention and new 
style patents), new invention and new style are at time t+1 compared to all 
independent variables. For example, in the first model, the share of licensing of a 
group in year 1981 is regressed on the total number of patents that group will file in 
1982. I first employ the negative binomial model for pooled sample. The group-level 
measure of control variables such as techopp (technological opportunity measured as 
industry-averaged R&D/Sales), appropriability and market concentration is achieved 
by taking weighted average with respect to the sales of each member firm. 
 



































































No. of Obs. 512 512 512 
Pseudo R2 0.0691 0.1374 0.0448 
Wald Chi2 120.09 148.38 39.12 
 
Note. z statistics in parentheses. * .p <0.10, **..p <0.05 (two-sided tests). 
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Table 6: Effects of External Linkages on Group Patenting (Panel regression using 
GEE population-averaged estimation model) 
 



































































No. of Obs. 512 512 512 
Pseudo R2 0.0691 ---- ---- 
Wald Chi2 51.01 513.12 20.41 
 
Note. z statistics in parentheses. * .p <0.10, **..p <0.05 (two-sided tests). 
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Table 7: Moderating effects of Geographic and Product Diversification on 
linkages-patenting relationship (parametric estimation with interaction terms) 
 
To test the moderating effects of geographic and product diversification, I regress 
three types of patents on the total number of linkages, the geographic and product 
diversification, and their interaction terms. The total number of linkages is the sum of 
all three types of external linkages. The geographic and product diversification are 
measured by the commonly used entropy index. The whole model specification is 
consistent with that in table 5.  
 



































































































































































No. of Obs. 512 512 512 512 512 512 
Pseudo R2 0.0731 0.1184 0.0454 ------- ------- ------- 
chi2 134.05 109.85 44.27 97.72 525.62 137.15 
Note. t statistics/ z statistics in parentheses. * .p <0.10, **..p <0.05 (two-sided tests). 
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis using R&D intensity (R&D/sales) as dependent 
variable 
 
To check the robustness of the results, I also employed R&D intensity as the input 
measure of innovation. As the dependent variable is a continuous measure, I use OLS 
regression together with various panel estimations (fixed, random and between effects 
model). The sample is drawn from the 512 group-year spreadsheet. However, since 
the R&D data before 1990 is not available, 333 group-year entries from the 512 
sample are tested. I use the R&D value of the core firm within a group as the 
representative for the R&D expenditure at the group level. Also, the dependent 
variable R&D intensity is with one year lag compared to all other explanatory 
variables. 
 























































































No. of Obs. 333 333 333 333 
R2 0.1550 0.0359 0.1268 0.1829 
F-stat 4.34 0.65 ---- 4.92 
Chi-sq ---- ---- 17.98 ---- 
Note. t statistics/ z statistics in parentheses. * .p <0.10, **..p <0.05 (two-sided tests). 
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Table 9: Propensity Score methods for causality test using Licensing 
 
The effect is computed as the mean of the ‘linkage’ effects within blocks of comparable treatment groups (increased licensing in time t+1) 
and control groups (did not increase licensing in time t+1), weighted by the number of observations in the block. Put simply, I compare 
the average innovation output (number of new invention, new style and total patents) between business groups that didn’t increase their 
linkages and those that increased their linkages. The blocks are defined by the quintiles (or even more) of the propensity score distribution 
for the groups that increased licensing. Propensity scores are the predict probabilities of increasing licensing from the logit model. The 
sample is drawn from the 512 group-year entries that used throughout this thesis. The selection procedure based on propensity score has 
eliminated all the observations that are incomparable between treatment and control groups. 
 
 Range of block Groups(not increase Licensing) Groups (increase Licensing) Difference  t-stat  














tion Style Total 
[1,] 0.059              0.102 0.775 0.737 2.875 80 0 1.111 2 9 -0.77 0.373 -0.87 -1.07 0.450 -0.37
[2,] 0.103                
                
                
                
               
0.185 0.272 0.509 2.109 55 0.2 0.5 0.9 10 -0.07 -0.01 -1.20 -0.26 -0.01 -0.75
[3,] 0.193 0.302 1.458 1.666 5.916 24 0.4 2.5 8.6 10 -1.05 0.833 2.683 -0.89 0.559 0.720
[4,] 0.315 0.477 0.928 1.571 3.214 14 3.7 2.4 10.4 10 2.771 0.828 7.185 0.926 0.477 1.706
[5,] 0.547 0.787 0.25 0 0.25 4 1.8 1.4 6.7 10 1.55 1.4 6.45 1.067 1.289 1.408
Mean 0.711 0.841 3.016  1.244 1.591 5.795  0.533 0.750 2.779 1.098 1.74* 2.35**
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Table 10: Propensity Score methods for causality test using JV 
 
 Range of block Groups (not increase JV) Groups (increase JV) Difference  t-stat  















[1,]                0.003 0.157 0.994 1.428 2.422 166 0.000 0.000 0.000 8 -0.99 -1.42 -2.42 -0.70 -0.39 -0.59
[2,]                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
0.157 0.181 0.357 0.500 0.857 14 0.000 0.000 0.000 8 -0.35 -0.50 -0.85 -1.18 -1.37 -1.85
[3,] 0.183 0.207 0.682 1.364 2.046 22 0.750 1.125 1.875 8 0.068 -0.23 -0.17 0.111 -0.16 -0.111
[4,] 0.209 0.238 0.400 1.500 1.900 10 4.286 4.000 8.286 7 3.886 2.500 6.386 1.397 0.880 1.185
[5,] 0.242 0.255 1.000 0.889 1.889 9 21.85 0.857 22.71 7 20.85 -0.03 20.82 1.117 -0.03 1.120
[6,] 0.278 0.348 0.056 0.278 0.333 18 2.125 0.375 2.500 8 2.069 0.097 2.167 1.498 0.285 1.561
[7,] 0.370 0.427 0.400 0.800 1.200 5 0.429 2.429 2.857 7 0.029 1.629 1.657 0.059 0.795 0.805
[8,] 0.445 0.561 0.556 4.889 5.444 9 0.571 0.000 0.571 7 0.016 -4.88 -4.87 0.042 -2.03 -2.01
Mean 0.814 1.383 2.198 3.550 1.050 4.600 2.736 -0.33 2.402 2.12** -0.30 1.367
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Table 11: Propensity Score methods for causality test using Acquisition 
 
 Range of block Groups(not increase Acquisition) Groups (increase Acquisition) Difference  t-stat  















[1,] 0.008               0.064 0.628 1.574 2.202 183 2.000 0.800 2.800 5 1.372 -0.77 0.598 1.413 -0.17 0.125
[2,] 0.065                
                
                
                
            
0.088 0.188 0.271 0.458 48 1.000 4.250 5.250 4 0.813 3.979 4.792 2.194 3.32 4.064
[3,] 0.090 0.120 0.148 0.926 1.074 27 4.250 0.000 4.250 4 4.102 -0.92 3.176 2.754 -0.64 1.514





1.546 1.091 2.636 11 0.000 1.750 1.750 4 -1.54 0.659 -0.88 -1.10 0.45 -0.41
Mean 0.814 1.260 1.800 3.550 1.429 2.905 2.736 0.169 1.105 2.07** 0.09 0.588
 Figure 1: Moderating Effects of Geographic Diversification on the Linkages-
Group Patenting relationship using Multivariate Kernel Regression with 
Nadaraya-Watson Estimator. 
Figure 1a: Total Patents 
 
Figure 1b: New Invention 
 
Figure 1c: New Style 
 
 
Note: Smoothing parameter was chosen as hbandwidth=20% of the range of GD and Licensing. 
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 Figure 2: Moderating Effects of Product Diversification on the Linkages-Group 
Patenting relationship using Multivariate Kernel Regression with Nadaraya-
Watson Estimator. 
Figure 2a: Total Patents 
 
Figure 2b: New Invention 
 
Figure 2c: New Style 
 
Note: Smoothing parameter was chosen as hbandwidth=20% of the range of PD and Linkages 
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 Figure 3: Sensitivity analyses on the moderating effects of Appropriability regime 
on the Licensing-Patenting relationship using Multivariate Kernel Regression 
with Nadaraya-Watson Estimator 
 









Note: Smoothing parameter was chosen as hbandwidth=20% of the range of Licensing and 
Appropriability 
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 End Notes 
                                                 
1 The remained other types mainly are market agencies which recorded the number of 
obtained product agencies. The effect of these marginal cases of linkages on 
innovation has not yet been well documented in existing body of literatures.  
2 The licensing in this study exclusively refers to licensing-in as opposed to licensing-
out. For most emerging economies, their technological capabilities still lag far behind 
those of developed economies. Therefore, licensing-out so far is almost negligible 
compared to the overwhelming amount of licensing-in. Under our empirical setting of 
emerging economies, I only focus on licensing-in in this study. 
3 The licensing in this study exclusively refers to licensing-in as opposed to licensing-
out. For most emerging economies, their technological capabilities still lag far behind 
those of developed economies. Therefore, licensing-out so far is almost negligible 
compared to the overwhelming amount of licensing-in. Under our empirical setting of 
emerging economies, I only focus on licensing-in in this study. 
4 The BGT books are published in traditional Chinese. In English, there are concerns 
that ‘collaboration’ may not necessarily mean a joint venture. In Chinese, however, 
there is less concern. Joint venture in Chinese are generally termed as ‘zhong wai he 
zi’ which in its literal meaning involves equity sharing. This eliminates the possibility 
that certain informal collaborations without equity commitment are coded as joint 
venture. 
5Before taking weighted average, the technological opportunities on industry level 
range from 0 (most non-manufacture industries) to 12.1 (communication equipment 
(electric industry)). Data is collected from “Research and Development in Industry”: 
1994, National Science Foundation, 97-331. 
6  Multivariate nonparametric regression aims to estimate the functional relation 
between a univariate response variable Y and a d-dimensional explanatory variable X, 
i.e. the conditional expectation )(),...,|()|( 1 XmXXYEXYE d == . The multivariate 
Nadaraya-Watson estimator can then be written as a generalization of the univariate 
case. Suppose that I have independent observations ( , then this 
estimator is defined as: 








































)()|1Pr( iii XfXD ==
,  
where  denotes a so-called kernel function, and h the bandwidth. For details,  
see Hardle, (1990, 1991) 
7 Simple Algorithm for estimating the Propensity Score (Dehejia and Wahba 1997, 
1998)
1.Estimating the propensity to increase external linkages using a logit model 
, 
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iXwhere  are group characteristics. D contributed to the empirical literature on 
innovation motives by including variables from a large set of linkages theories.  
2.Computing the propensity scores for both treatment and control observations from 
the predicted values in the model of step1. Separating treatment and control groups 
(increased external linkages vs. did not increase external linkages). Discarding all 
those groups that are not comparable in terms of propensity score 
3.Classifying (using K-means clustering methods (see Johnson and Wichern 2002) 
all groups (increase and non-increase) into blocks initially categorized by the quantiles 
of the propensity score distribution for ‘non-increase’ groups. 
4.For each within-block propensity score, doing t-test and F-test of differences in 
means and standard errors between the ‘increased’ and ‘non-increased’ groups within 
each block. Repeat step 3 dividing blocks into finer blocks and re-evaluating if a block 
is not well balanced:  
5.Estimate the effect of linkages changes on patenting performance by taking the 
weighted average (by number observations) of the within-block mean differences in 
patenting performance between ‘increase’ and ‘non-increase’ groups. This is the 
average treatment effect on the controlled in the causal inference literature. 
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